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ABSTRACT
A diverse array of empirical research posits a general tendency for people to
prefer the status quo over change, all else being equal. In two experiments, we explore
the status quo preference phenomenon from a motivated cognition, uncertainty
management perspective. Extending the precepts of several related empirical traditions
(e.g. terror management theory, system justification theory and related topics), we
explore the premise that uncertainty management processes activate social cognitive
mechanisms directly favoring the status quo, similar to previously established process
mechanisms such as terror management. Across two studies, we find support for the idea
that both uncertainty and mortality salience magnify peoples’ pre-existing ideological
preferences.

xii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The status quo delineates that which is, in contrast to that which is not. We know
that which is, while that which is not remains unknown. Change in the field of everyday
life can be daunting; it is often associated with cost, risk and danger. Regardless of its
fruits, change is necessarily more laborious than maintaining the status quo. Change
requires action, whereas the status quo does not. An individual is responsible for his or
her actions, whereas no such responsibility can be conferred on account of an individual’s
non-actions. In this way, the status quo implicitly suggests a low level of personal risk,
while endorsing change suggests the opposite. The status quo tacitly indicates the known
or certain, while the alternative indicates the unknown or uncertain. Conceptual and
semantic linkages pair the status quo with favorability, while pairing it’s opposite with
unfavorability. Such are just some of the many forms and manifestations of status quo
preference.
A large and established body of empirical literature demonstrates that all else
being equal, individuals prefer extant status quo realities to alternatives (Eidelman &
Crandall, 2009; Eidelman, Crandall, and Pattershall, 2009). This may occur even when
status quo realities appear to be, from a rational choice perspective, non-optimal. The
status quo preference literature suggests that at an individual as well as a societal level,
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humans accept or justify status quo realities which are far from ideal, preferring the
“devil they know” over uncertainties associated with change.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) established that when a choice between
endorsing the status quo vs. an alternative is presented to an individual, the status quo
tends to be preferred (for reviews, see Anderson, 2003; Eidelman, et al., 2009). People
may prefer the status quo because the potential risks or costs of change are perceived to
outweigh the perceived benefits, as suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) and the associated principle of loss aversion. Furthermore, people may
prefer the status quo because of cognitions or feelings that the status quo ultimately
serves them or the greater good, a psychological mechanism postulated by theoretical
perspectives including System Justification Theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and Belief in a
Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980). People may rationalize the status quo in order to make
the best of extant realities via self-serving cognitive construals. That is to say, people may
hold beliefs and worldviews that the universe is generally fair and good, in effect
producing just outcomes, manifested in status quo realities. Psychological processes
lending favor to the status quo may all operate in concert to varying degrees, dependent
upon the salient features of the judgment at hand and the individual characteristics of the
perceiver. In any case, the resultant phenomenon is an enduring psychological preference
for the status quo.
Evaluative Advantages of the Status Quo
The status quo indicates “the way things are,” which tends to be psychologically
connected to “the way things ought to be.” With intellectual roots tracing back to the Age
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of Reason, scholars have long posited that the connection between existence and
goodness is embedded in our worldviews and unspoken assumptions regarding the laws
that govern the universe. David Hume (1739/1978) referred to this seemingly irrational
psychological confound as the is-ought fallacy, terminology which remains in use today
in describing the phenomena, while G.E. Moore (1903), in his magnum opus Principia
Ethica, coined the term naturalistic fallacy to refer to an essentially identical principle. In
both cases, such “fallacies” 1 are described as biasing evaluative judgments in favor of
that which is, that which does exist; in other words, the status quo. Observe that the term
status quo conjures something of a historical, political or cultural significance; this is not
happenstance, but rather a marker of its social-cognitive underpinnings. Individuals
assume that extant reality exists for a reason, a purpose, or by some natural or divine law.
As such, the perceived status quo holds an advantage against its contenders by means of
its implied benevolent structural integrity, and through this process the association
between goodness and existence is forged. This inference appears to be active rather than
passive, causing individuals to zealously dismiss, disregard or devalue status quo
alternatives, particularly in matters of choice (for reviews of this literature, see Anderson,
2003; Eidelman et al. 2009). I shall now specify several sub-structural mechanisms which
have been empirically demonstrated to confer an evaluative advantage upon the status
quo.

Philosophical debate ensues as to whether or not the is-ought/naturalistic fallacies can be
properly referred to as fallacious in a strict definitional sense; See, Frankena (1939) for an in depth
discussion of this issue.
1
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The familiarity/mere exposure effect. A substantial body of empirical research
demonstrates that all else being equal, repeated exposure to a stimulus facilitates a
positive attitude toward it (For a meta-analytic review, see Bornstein, 1989). This effect
has been found to occur in respect to a wide array of judgment stimuli including persons,
words, visual images, and musical pieces (Eidelman et al., 2009). Generally, this line of
research stipulates that that which is oft encountered is well known, and that which is
well known is perceived as safe and good. Therefore, by processes of mere exposure, the
stimulus increases in evaluative favor while simultaneously becoming the status quo.
Dissonance reduction effects. Much dissonance reduction research demonstrates
that the desirability of chosen options is enhanced, while the desirability of foregone
options is devalued (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001; Kay, Jiminez, and Jost, 2002; Shultz and
Lepper, 1996). The commitment to our own choices causes us to exaggerate the
difference between the desirability of that which is chosen compared to the desirability of
that which is rejected. This motivated cognition serves to reduce the post decision
cognitive dissonance that occurs subsequent to a choice based selection, and manifests as
both a valuation of the selected choice in addition to an even greater (in relative
magnitude) devaluation of the non-selected choice (Brehm, 1956). This valuation of
chosen options coupled with a devaluation of rejected options has been referred to as the
“spreading of alternatives” effect (Eidelman et al., 2009).
In regards to the enhancement of chosen selections, the less positive features of
the chosen selection are enhanced by being mentally transformed from unfavorable to
favorable, as opposed to, for instance, an evaluative boost regarding the most desirable
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aspects of the choice (Gerard and White, 1983). Additionally noteworthy is the consistent
finding that enhancement of selected choices is greatest when the spread of available
options is relatively unattractive (Shultz and Lepper, 1996; Shultz, Leveille, and Lepper,
1999). As suggested by Hume (1739/1978) and Lerner (1980), the status quo usually
indicates a “chosen” alternative in the arena of everyday life, if not by the individual,
then by society or natural law. Return now to my previous assertion that the term status
quo is politically or socio-culturally connotative in nature. The supposition is that current
social and political entities (persons, institutions, and cultural norms) are perceived as
chosen (at least relative to nonexistent entities), and thus their desirability is magnified,
lending further advantage to the status quo.
Kay et al.’s (2002) study on post-election candidate evaluation discovered that
winning candidates are enhanced in value following their victory, while losing candidates
are devalued following their loss. Prior to an election decision, the candidates are seen as
much closer in terms of desirability, yet after the results are tallied, this spreading of
alternatives effect results in a sharp devaluation of the non-elected, accompanied by an
evaluative enhancement of the elected. Scholarship on the incumbency advantage appears
to corroborate this general premise, demonstrating a particularly potent advantage for
previously victorious candidates, controlling for a large host of other factors relevant to
electability (for a review, see Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002).
Insofar as an election represents a collective choice, then cognitive dissonance
theory can be applied to interpret the empirical effects just described. That is to say,
subsequent to the nation’s choice for president, collective evaluations shift such that the

6
winner comes to be perceived as relatively more favorable while the loser comes to be
perceived as relatively less favorable. Analogously, the longstanding literature in
cognitive dissonance theory demonstrates that with respect to a wide variety of personal
choices, individuals’ post-choice evaluations shift towards favoring the chosen alternative
(Beasley and Joslyn, 2001; Shultz and Lepper, 1996, Brehm, 1956, Lyubomirsky and
Ross, 1999; For a review, see Kay, Jiminez, and Jost, 2002).
Ironically, the effects of cognitive dissonance as just described may potentially
self-contradict at the individual and group levels. Consider, for instance, a person who
votes for the candidate who will eventually lose. After voting for their candidate, both
dissonance theory and status quo preference theories predict an evaluative boost for the
chosen (voted for) candidate. When this individual finds that their candidate has lost the
election, however, both dissonance theory and status quo preference theories would
predict a relative evaluative boost for the elected candidate. Whether the final net effect
for this voter would be that of growing favor or disfavor for the elected candidate,
however, is subject to a smorgasbord of extraneous factors. Nonetheless, both dissonance
theory and status quo preference theories tend to converge on similar predictions
regarding how individuals react to and evaluate stimuli which come to be interpreted as
the status quo.
Negative perception of reformers. Thus far I have posited that alternatives to the
status quo are generally devalued, which can have a net effect of bolstering the status
quo. Relatedly, research demonstrates that reformers (those who seek to change the status
quo) are viewed more negatively than those who endorse the status quo. This is in part
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due to evaluations that those who seek to change the status quo are “extremists” with
difficult personalities and unreasonable reform goals. Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross
(1995), for instance, found that individuals who support status quo sociopolitical norms
view the magnitude of disagreement between supporters of the status quo vs. change as
much more extreme than do the reformers themselves. In other words, status quo
supporters view reformers as “further way” from the proper position than reformers view
status quo supporters. The resultant effect is that reformers are less likely to demonize
their political enemies, in comparison to those who oppose reform. Since the status quo
already holds an evaluative advantage amongst political centrists, further fuel is added to
the flame of change devaluation via this novel mechanism.
People and ideas are guilty by association; ideas are measured by the characters
who proffer them, and individuals are assessed by the values and ideas they endorse. A
biased negative perception of reformers’ ideas transfers to a biased perception of the
personality characteristics and moral character of the reformers themselves. Robinson et
al. (1995) notably found that those seeking to change the status quo regarding abortion
laws are seen as unreasonable and extreme by both sides of the abortion debate.
Similarly, Keltner and Robinson (1997) found that “revisionist” faculty within an English
department (those who challenged the status quo perspective), were judged by people on
both sides of the issue as less reasonable and more extreme individuals, indicating an
overall devaluation of reformers, even by those who are initially not particularly
antagonistic toward the reforms themselves. If issue stances endorsed by reformers are
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seen as more extreme in a systematically biased fashion, then they may also be viewed as
undesirable and/or unattainable.
O’Brien and Crandall (2005) further exhibit the presence of prejudicial attitudes
toward reformers with empirical evidence indicating that reformers are viewed as more
self-interested than status quo supporters. As such, reformers are viewed as being
relatively selfish, unscrupulous individuals looking out for their own best interests as
opposed to those of society. The implications of such prejudicial attitudes towards
reformers (and by extension the reforms they advocate) are clear. If it is believed that
reforms are spearheaded by relatively selfish and untrustworthy individuals, then the
reforms for which they advocate are also to be viewed with suspicion.
Mere existence bias. Perhaps the most distilled mechanism of evaluative
preference for the status quo is the recently coined mere existence bias. Scholarship on
the mere existence bias indicates that even under meticulously stringent laboratory
conditions in which the contributing effects of other status quo preference mechanisms
(e.g. those discussed thus far) are controlled for or eviscerated, preference for the status
quo remains (Eidelman et al. 2009). This recent line of empirical investigation suggests
that evaluations of positive value are directly derived from a particular position being
labeled as the status quo, complementing the more circuitous processes such as those
presented earlier, in addition to the yet to be discussed rational choice mechanisms.
This direct evaluative association further reinforces shared networks of semantic
activation, grouping the concept of status quo with positivity and its alternatives with
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negativity. In other words, thoughts of the status quo automatically activate value
judgments, due to their relation to that which is known, secure, safe and natural.
Eidelman et al. (2009), for instance, find that a seemingly value absent distinction
between a status quo reality and an alternative still garners preference for the status quo,
even when: the substantive content of the status quo is counterbalanced over multiple
conditions, the effects of perceived cost are statistically controlled for, the participants
have no personal stake in the issue, and pre-existing attitudes toward the two options are
nonexistent or minimized to the point of practical irrelevance. In these studies,
participants rated the status quo as more “good,” “right” and “the way things ought to
be,” regardless of the substantive content of the status quo position.
Numerous cognitive processing mechanisms stack the deck in favor of positive
evaluations regarding the status quo. Rooted in a characteristically cognitive perspective,
Fishbein & Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Planned Behavior, for example, posits that factors
such as biased accessibility and belief strength will each influence evaluative outcomes in
their respective stages of cognitive processing. Biased accessibility, for instance, may
render positive outcomes associated with the status quo more accessible than positive
outcomes associated with choosing alternatives. Likewise, negative outcomes associated
with the status quo may be less accessible than negative outcomes associated with
choosing alternatives. Another relevant factor from Fishbein & Ajzen’s (1975) theoretical
model is belief strength, in this case regarding the likelihood of outcomes expected to
result from going with the status quo vs. an alternative. Specifically, positive outcomes
associated with the status quo may be viewed as more likely to ensue than positive
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outcomes associated with an alternative. Likewise, negative outcomes associated with the
status quo might be viewed as less likely to ensue than negative outcomes associated with
an alternative. Hailing from a similar perspective, Krosnick (1988) demonstrated that
attitude importance weighting is related to the spreading of alternatives effect, such that
higher levels of importance predict exaggerated evaluative differences among competing
alternatives, potentially serving as a multiplier effect in terms of the status-quo’s
evaluative advantage.
Eidelman et al. (2009) describe the existence bias as a heuristic; and like other
heuristics, it serves to enhance processing efficiency, if not accuracy. Models concerning
biased information processing at various stages from encoding to retrieval offer a
valuable lens through which to understand the roots of status quo bias. A central premise
of the mere existence bias, however, is that the association between existence and
goodness requires no supposition of rational inputs in order to manifest, though
rationalizations are to be expected. In the words of Eidelman et al. (2009), pp. 73,
“Although assumed reasons may undergird some forms of existence bias, they do not
seem necessary…” I shall further elaborate on the nature of these “assumed reasons” in
the following section.
Rational Choice Perspectives
In many cases, status quo preference can be accounted for by invoking principles
of behavioral economics. That is to say, the magnitude of costs associated with change
may, in the eyes of the perceiver, counteract and offset the expected magnitude of its
potential benefits. Consider this principle from a strictly mathematical perspective. If the
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utility of the status quo is rated as a three (with higher numbers denoting greater
desirability), and the utility of the alternative is rated as five, a rational individual would
be expected to engage in change only if the expected cost associated with the change is
less than two. Cost in this sense does not merely refer to money. Rather it denotes a
perceived loss of any sort, whether it be time, personal security, mental effort, et cetera.
Change necessarily requires action, even in the most minimal sense of mentally
considering its adoption. The status quo alternative must therefore necessarily invoke
some kind of extra cost, serving to balance the utilitarian equation in favor of the status
quo.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) coined the term status quo bias to refer to this
general tendency to evaluate the status quo as superior for reasons pertaining to its
perceived advantage in utility. Rational choice, utilitarian, considerations are also a key
component of theoretical perspectives including Social Dominance Theory and System
Justification Theory, which posit that those who benefit the most from the status quo in
society tend to be its most formidable defenders. Such individuals tend to further
promulgate what Jost and colleagues might deem a “legitimizing myth”: the belief that
that excessive societal costs tend to accompany social change. Rational choice
approaches tend to construe status quo justification as a generally rational endeavor,
serving the interests of the self or group. It is critical to note that such cognitive inputs
need not be formed in a “rational” manner for rational choice models to apply. Rather,
similar to the cognitive process models described previously, rational choice models aim
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to describe how such inputs (whatever their origin) enter into a cognitive equation in
order to produce predictable evaluative outcomes.
Loss aversion is key component of status quo bias, as first conceptualized by
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). In experiment one of this series of studies,
participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of a variety of financial investment
strategies. Preference for the status quo was observed, controlling for the substantive
content of the status quo vs. the alternative. Additionally, Samuelson and Zeckhauser
found that university employees held a biased preference toward accepting the university
healthcare plan in which they were already enrolled, while no preference was observed
for individuals who were not already enrolled in any plan (and thus, had no status quo
enrollment status). In other words, when a particular plan had the opportunity to be seen
as the status quo, it was preferred against an alternative, yet such an effect did not emerge
when neither option was perceived as the status quo.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were perhaps the first to empirically establish that
people tend to disproportionally weigh losses against gains. Further research establishes
that all else being equal, people evaluate losses as more severe than gains of the same
magnitude (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). As such, the perceived costs of
switching from the status quo to an alternative may be unduly magnified, resulting in
status quo preference. Other experimental research establishes that in respect to financial
decisions, people imagine greater regret for action than inaction, even when the outcomes
of each option are essentially identical (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Landman,
1988; for a review, see Anderson, 2003).
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In a popular experimental template which may be referred to as the “lottery tick et
paradigm,” participants are given a lottery ticket and then offered an opportunity to
exchange it with another participant. In these studies, participants overwhelmingly
choose not to trade their ticket for another of equal value and probability of winning,
even when enticed with additional incentives to switch. Such findings elucidate the
imbalanced psychological consequences of counterfactual regret; a person with a losing
ticket who failed to switch would of course experience regret, but not nearly as much as a
person who possessed a winning ticket and traded it away. For a review of empirical
studies which utilize the lottery ticket paradigm, see Van de Ven and Zeelenberg (2011).
Such findings accord with a lay understanding of attributional responsibility, by which
people are generally held responsible (blamed) for their actions, but not their non-actions.
For this reason, a non-action (which functionally serves as an implicit endorsement of the
status quo) is tacitly preferred.
I again note that inputs to rational choice “equations” may be derived from
processes of biased motivated cognition, and that hot cognitive theoretical models of
status quo preference may harbor rational choice components. The categorical distinction
between purely rational choice explanations for status quo preference versus those rooted
in cognitive and/or evaluative biases can at times be blurry. For example, Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988), in their formulation of the status quo bias, focus heavily on principles
of aversion toward risk, loss, and regret as explanatory mechanisms. Status quo
preference rooted in such human tendencies may be viewed as relatively rational or
irrational, depending upon how one wishes to define rationality. If one were to author a
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decision making algorithm with the goal of maximizing total utility, it would appear
nonsensical to specify special tendencies toward risk, loss and regret aversion; choices
should be based solely on the expected value of decision outcomes.
Some theorists would define “rationality” in a manner that leads them to conclude
that it is rational to diverge from expected utility when dealing with events which occur
extremely rarely, for a variety of reasons, including societal norms and values which
dictate that people act carefully, without risking the wellbeing of themselves or others.
Unlike expected utility theory, factors such as subjective norms are taken into account by
the theory of reasoned action and similar perspectives (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
According to such theories, the effect of expected utility (i.e. attitude toward the
behavior) can be overshadowed by the effect of internalized societal norms when
individuals formulate an attitude or behavioral decision.
Furthermore, if one takes into account anticipated counterfactual regret, it can be
construed as “rational” to make decisions which knowingly do not align with expected
value maximization. Consider for example that a benevolent stranger approaches you and
offers you a choice: a $5 million dollar gift now, or the chance to flip a coin to win more.
If the coin comes up heads, you win $20 million, but if it comes up tails, you win
nothing. The coin-flip option has an expected value of $10 million, which is twice the
expected value of the foregone option, exceeding the expected value of that option by $5
million. Yet, one can plainly see that it is not at all irrational to take the $5 million dollar
option. Considering the effects of anticipated counterfactuals, the “psychological
expected value” of each of the potential outcomes can often diverge from mathematical
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calculations of expected value, as illustrated by the above case. In a similar fashion, loss
and risk aversion might generally be considered symptoms of a rather sophisticated sense
of rationality. In any case, rational choice theories of status quo preference focus
primarily upon relatively “cold” cognitive inputs, as opposed more motivational or
emotional “hot” factors.
General Conclusions
As examined in this chapter, a variety of psychological processes lend to the
phenomenon known as status quo preference. I have thus far overviewed some of the key
explanatory mechanisms by which cognitive and evaluative tendencies bolster the status
quo. In this dissertation, I focus on the components of status quo preference hypothesized
to originate in motivations of a highly abstract, symbolic and primordial nature.
Fundamental human drives to escape existential darkness and find one’s place in the
universe harbor implications for understanding status quo preference. Existential,
humanistic, affective and motivational schools of thought have long posited that a large
array of human cognitions and behaviors are shaped by underlying epistemic and
existential drives. Status quo preference is a phenomenon congenial to this thesis, such
that the status quo implies that which is known, safe, secure, and good. The alternative
implies that which is epistemically ambiguous and existentially frightening. I herein posit
that affective and motivational forces of this nature play a direct role in the psychological
phenomena of status quo preference. I shall now shift the discussion toward the nature of
such “forces,” namely, the psychological need to manage uncertainty.

CHAPTER TWO
THE UNCERTAINTY MOTIVE
Humanity strives to progress from a position of uncertainty toward certainty, from
ignorance toward knowledge, from insecurity toward security, and, ultimately, from
negativity toward positivity. This principle is embodied in western mythological
symbolism, whereby the unknown is represented by darkness, and the known represented
by light. The physical act of shining a flashlight into a dark forest illuminates the contents
of that forest, allowing one to successfully navigate the terrain. Allegorically, that which
is known is relatively certain, secure and good; while that which is unknown is relatively
uncertain, insecure and bad. The certainty, security, and predictability that knowledge
brings “illuminates” us, separating dark from light. 2
In the psychological literature, the term “uncertainty” describes an experience
which occurs when individuals face incompatibility between different cognitions,
between cognitions and behaviors, between cognitions and experiences, or when one
faces an inability to predict the future or know the world (Van den Bos and Lind, 2002;
Hogg, 2000). This wide reaching definition captures several qualitatively distinct social
aspects of the uncertainty experience. We may orient the concept of uncertainty in
relation to the future, the world, or the self. In each case, uncertainty denotes a state of
These remarks should be viewed as a description of social cognitive linkages, and should not be
interpreted as representing the author’s worldview.
2
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ignorance, of not knowing. It is the position of humankind to attempt to convert the
unknown into the known, to move from a state of certainty toward uncertainty. Through
such processes people find meaning, which brings comfort and security.
Uncertainty Harbors Both Epistemic and Existential Implications
I use the term epistemic motivation to indicate the human drive to seek
knowledge, including the need to verify that one’s mode of knowledge acquisition is
valid. I use the term existential motivation to indicate the human drive to seek meaning,
particularly meaning relevant to the self. We use the term “meaning” in the sense of
Heine & Proulx (2006), progenitors of the Meaning Maintenance Model, who state,
“…people have a need for meaning; that is, a need to perceive events through a prism of
mental representations of expected relations that organizes their perceptions of the
world.” (Heine & Proulx, 2006, p. 88). Stated otherwise, meaning refers to systems of
“expected cognitive associations” (Proulx & Heine, 2006). These cognitive associations
encompass “anything that one might expect to be related to anything else—people,
places, objects, events—in any way that they could be construed as related—causally,
spatial-temporally, teleologically,” (Proulx & Heine 2006, p. 310). Interestingly, Proulx
& Heine (2006) suggest that when people encounter a stimulus in which they cannot find
meaning (i.e. expected relations are violated), a fluid compensation occurs in which
meaning is sought. Often this meaning takes the form of “cultural worldviews” which
function as schemas informing one as to proprietary relations among people, objects, and
concepts encountered in the social world.
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When expected relations between inanimate objects or concepts not relevant to
the self are violated, such cases should be most accurately described as “epistemic,” if
they primarily challenge knowledge frameworks. When expected relations relevant to the
self are violated, such cases should be most accurately described as “existential,” if they
primarily challenge ideas pertaining to the understanding of the self and human
experience. As an example of this distinction, consider what people’s reactions would be
to news of confirmed intelligent extraterrestrial contact in outer space. For many, this
news would be existentially challenging, since it would almost certainly force individuals
to confront sacred beliefs regarding the self, humankind, and God. The primary alarm to
the psyche resulting from such news has less to do with a mere violation of non-selfrelevant knowledge structures, and more to do with metaphysical, spiritual, existential
issues. Now contrast this with another hypothetical scenario that beyond light-speed
travel is discovered to be possible. Encountering this news would likely be epistemically
challenging for many, as this news contradicts information which has been wholly
accepted and taught as scientific fact for many years in classrooms worldwide. The
thought of beyond light speed travel, however, does not readily conjure the kinds of
uncertainties as those which would be expected by the former (extraterrestrial encounter)
case described above. This is because any self-relevant implications of the latter (beyond
light speed travel) case are not readily apparent, at least by comparison with the former
case. Of course, the psychological impact of any expected-relations violating information
will vary widely by individual and culture. Epistemic and existential motivations are
expected to share a great deal of overlap in terms of psychological impact, since

19
knowledge is determined by our meaning frameworks, and our sense of meaning is
determined by our knowledge frameworks.
William James (1890) was perhaps the first psychologists to posit that uncertainty
reduction is motivated by a need to “simplify psychological experiences.” Other notable
early psychologists, such as Ernst Jentsch (1906/1995), who expounded upon the
psychological phenomena to which he referred to as “the uncanny,” found inspiration in
James’ early hypotheses in this domain. Other emerging schools of thought, including
psychoanalysis, took on a somewhat different perspective (e.g. Freud, 1919/1958).
Empirical evidence has now been garnered in favor this general “epistemic simplicity”
perspective, including studies which demonstrate that uncertainty reduction processes are
partially motivated by a need to reach cognitive closure (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996).
Such research suggests that when people do not have the cognitive capacity to
systematically process, they seek certainty. This frees up cognitive resources allocated to
uncertainty management and simplifies psychological experiences.
Sigmund Freud (1919/1958), Frederic Barlett (1932) (a predominant forerunner of
social cognitive psychology), and other emerging schools of psychological thought also
became interested in the construct of “uncertainty,” and posited an uncertainty reduction
drive mechanism conceptually distinct from the search for epistemic knowledge as touted
by James (1890). They posited that uncertainty management was fundamentally rooted in
a quest for meaning rather than knowledge. That is to say, uncertainty management was
hypothesized to be motivationally driven by man’s need to “connect” with the world
around him, as opposed to being motivated by mere intellectual curiosity. Thus, the
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orientation of Bartlett (1932), Freud (1919/1958) and others toward uncertainty
management can be characterized as existentially situated, in contrast to James’ (1890)
and Jentsch’s (1906/1995) more epistemically oriented point of view.
The term epistemic refers to certainty regarding one’s knowledge about the world,
while existential refers to certainty regarding one’s relational connection to the reality of
existence, or the perception of being self-aware. Epistemic uncertainty may harbor
existential concerns, and existential uncertainty in turn may harbor epistemic concerns.
One could reasonably argue that existential issues are the ultimate source of uncertainty’s
negative valence, insofar as it is not lack of knowledge itself which individuals find
disturbing, but rather what that lack of knowledge stands to imply about existential
meaning and value. In any case, these two subconscious motivational sources of
uncertainty may operate in conjunction to produce a negative affective experience, and,
due to the negative valence associated with psychological uncertainty, individuals are
generally motivated to reduce it.
As a brief demonstration regarding the difference between epistemic and
existential psychological domains, I offer some examples of characteristically epistemic
and existential questions. “Is oxygen necessary to breathe?” “Does inflation decrease the
value of the dollar?,” “Are carbon dioxide emissions a cause global warming?,” “Is the
world flat?” are primarily epistemic questions, though may harbor varying degrees of
existential implication. Questions such as “What is the purpose of my life?,” “Does
everything “happen for a reason”?,” “Why am I living?,” and “Who am I? What is my
place in the universe?” would be more accurately characterized as primarily existential.
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Generalized Worldview Defense as a Mechanism of Uncertainty Reduction
When an individual is faced with uncertainty, affirming one’s worldview can be
palliative. This is because worldviews effectively function to address core existential
questions. A plethora of empirical research indeed demonstrates that the affirmation or
defense of cultural worldviews reduces negative feelings associated with subjective
uncertainty (Hogg, 2000; Hogg, 2005; Hogg, 2007; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas,
Miedema, and Van den Ham, 2005; for a review see, Van Den Bos, 2009). Personally
and culturally valued worldviews convert the world into a predictable place and help
individuals navigate reality, therefore satisfying epistemic needs. Worldviews are largely
shaped by life experiences of an epistemological nature. Hence, individuals naturally
draw upon their worldviews in order to resolve or interpret epistemic uncertainties. When
worldviews do not offer an acceptable level of epistemic uncertainty reduction, one will
engage in information seeking until epistemic needs have been satisfied. Epistemically,
worldviews buffer against threats by suggesting that uncertainty can be resolved via the
acquisition, retrieval, or reconceptualization of information. Worldviews also help secure
an appraisal of meaning in the world, and in doing so satisfy existential needs.
Worldviews can attenuate existential anxiety by providing a mechanism through which
people may symbolically transcend existential despair, as suggested by Terror
Management Theory and related perspectives (Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008).
Extreme feelings of existential despair often culminate in an attraction toward
totalistic worldviews (for a comprehensive review, see Hogg and Blaylock, 2012).
Markedly totalistic worldviews, including various forms of religious fundamentalism and
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sociopolitical utopianism, leave little or no room for existential doubt or despair. This
perhaps accounts for the particularly seductive nature of these worldviews, which
ultimately manifest in the form of political and religious cults. Totalistic worldviews
declare absolute and inerrant certainty regarding the nature of the ideologies contained
within them, and also tend to firmly stake a claim on the nature of existential purpose, or
the meaning of life. As such, the upholding of cultural worldviews helps to ward off
existential uncertainty and assuage its associated negative affect (Van den Bos, Heuven,
Burger, and Fernández Van Veldhuizen, 2006). Consequently, when individuals are
exposed to situations which magnify uncertainty, the implicit goal of worldview
affirmation is automatically activated (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2005).
For example, Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet and Maas (2007), found that
priming uncertainty salience caused exaggerated negative affective responses toward
individuals criticizing their home country (a worldview threat). In a second study, Van
den Bos, et al. (2007) found that individuals who tend to perceive uncertainty as very
emotionally upsetting condemned homeless people to a particularly large degree.
Homelessness is implicitly seen as a symptom of cultural deviancy and/or sociopolitical
failure. In either case, the prevalence of homelessness is implicitly worldview
threatening. Hence, Van den Bos, et al. (2007) argue that the negative reactions exhibited
by uncertainty sensitive individuals elucidate a direct connection between subjective
uncertainty and the condemnation of worldview violators, or those who challenge the
normative status quo.
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A religion is a unique worldview system which ties the natural world to
supernatural or metaphysical concepts. Religion, generally speaking, attempts to answer
life’s deep existential and epistemic questions including the “meaning of life” and the
proper relation among objects and beings within the universe. A review by Hogg,
Adelman & Blagg (2010) corroborates this perspective, offering the case that religions
are “…entitative groups that provide a moral compass and rules for living that pervade a
person’s life, making them particularly attractive in times of uncertainty.” Uncertainty is
diminished by reducing complexity to simplistic forms. Shades of grey are reduced to
black and white, evil and good et cetera. Total faith in an inerrable leader and simple
solutions to life’s problems tend to be markers of more dangerous religious cults, whose
doctrinal attempts to address uncertainty become as extreme as the cultists’ need to
squelch it. In the words of Jason Begue, former high ranking member of the cult of
Scientology, “One of the major things they that sell to get people to buy their services is:
certainty. You will have certainty in your life, which is very seductive. People want to
know. People want to know. It’s difficult, I think, for people to wonder, to not know. And
so, they’re seduced, by this certainty. But when you think about it, it can be quite
dangerous.”
Epistemic ideologies proffered by religion are generally thought of as coming
from a divine being or principle, and therefore must be epistemically correct, in effect
eviscerating epistemic doubts and uncertainties. Van den Bos, Van Ameijde, and Van
Gorp (2006) found in a nationally representative sample including more than 1,500
participants, that personal uncertainty concerns were positively related to negative
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affective reactions toward statements critical of religion. Importantly, this effect emerged
strongest among individuals who viewed personal uncertainty as emotionally threatening.
Further along these lines, the individual difference variable of uncertainty avoidance has
been found to be negatively correlated with both tolerance of diversity and openness to
experience (Hofstede, 2001). Other experimental evidence demonstrates that people who
are made to feel uncertain more zealously defend threats to their worldviews, in
comparison to individuals not made to feel uncertain (McGregor, 2004; McGregor and
Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer, 2001). Furthermore, Hogg
(2000; 2004; 2005) demonstrates that the experience of personal uncertainty elevates the
attractiveness of strict orthodox worldviews and ideologies. With these statements, I do
not intend to paint religion as psychologically undesirable. Rather, I suggest that religion
easily lends itself to the task of epistemic and existential uncertainty reduction.
Uncertainty and Negative Valence
The empirical literature firmly establishes that uncertainty tends to be associated
with negative affect, at either or both implicit and explicit levels (Kruglanski, 2004; Van
Den Bos, 2009; Van Den Bos, et al., 2005; Hogg, 2000; Fiske and Taylor, 1991;
Sorrentino and Roney, 1986). In fact, some psychological definitions of uncertainty have
gone so far as to work the negative valence associated with uncertainty into its very
definition, such as Monat, Averill and Lazarus (1972, pp. 237), who define uncertainty as
“the period of anticipation prior to confrontation with a potentially harmful event.”
Similarly, prominent contemporary uncertainty scholar Kees Van den Bos (2009, pp.
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186), defines personal uncertainty as “subjective sense of doubt or instability in selfviews, worldviews, and the interrelations between the two.”
Studies on the physiological effects of uncertainty have demonstrated that
experiencing uncertainty coincides with a physical stress response characteristic of
perceived threat, including hormonal changes, raised blood pressure, and immune
response activation (see Zakowski, 1995; Mason et al., 1973). Individuals exhibiting high
levels of emotional uncertainty (as measured by the emotional uncertainty scale) are
thought to demonstrate a maladaptive coping strategy in which subjective uncertainty is
particularly emotionally upsetting. Individuals scoring high on this measure are likely to
respond to subjective uncertainty with particularly high levels of frustration and anxiety.
Additionally, highly emotionally uncertain individuals tend to score high on measures of
neuroticism and emotional rumination (negatively valenced). They also tend to be more
preoccupied with stressful situations, and tend to exhibit relatively low self-esteem
(Greco and Roger, 2001).
The Uncertainty Management Drive
Philosophers of mind have long posted a universal human need to find certainty in
life. The discussion of such ideas traces at least as far back as classical antiquity, but can
more recently be traced to the intense 19th psychological philosophizing which predated
the psychological sciences, notably that of Søren Kierkegaard. In the early 20th century,
scholars who would prove to be incalculably influential at the crossroads of philosophy
and psychology, such as Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger, produced writings
which spoke to the psychology uncertainty and its sociopolitical implications.
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When psychology began to emerge as a distinct discipline in the late 19th century,
ideas surrounding subjective psychological uncertainty and its epistemic existential
implications were explored by early psychological theorists of diverse perspectives
including William James, Erich Fromm, and of course, Sigmund Freud. The rise and fall
of Behaviorism and its antithesis, Cognitivism, shifted the focus of the psychological
sciences away from phenomena of this nature during the latter half of the 20th century.
Leading contemporary scholars, however, have begun to revitalize scholarship on this
and related topics with an exciting abundance of empirical evidence consistent with an
existentialist account of uncertainty management. See Hogg & Blaylock (2012), for a
general survey of the burgeoning cotemporary research in this content domain.
Indeed, a plethora of research firmly establishes the connection between
uncertainty and negatively valenced affect (for reviews of this extensive literature, see
Hogg, 2000; Van den Bos, 2009a). Uncertainty would not need to be “managed”
(reduced) if it tended to be positively valenced. The valence of uncertainty, however, is
not necessarily always negative in connotation. The affective valence of uncertainty may
be moderated by context and situation. The emotionally optimal or desired level of
uncertainty is likely to systematically vary across both persons and situations. Empirical
research does indeed demonstrate that the experience of personal uncertainty may foster
awe, curiosity, and other positively valenced cognitive and affective experiences under
the right conditions (e.g. McGregor and Marigold, 2003; Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta,
Olson, and Hewitt, 1988; Weary and Jacobson, 1997). The idea that uncertainty may
arouse positive emotions related to awe is not new to the field of psychology. In the
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words of Erich Fromm (1949), “The quest for certainty blocks the search for meaning.
Uncertainty is the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers.” Despite the
apparent assertion here that uncertainty is inspiring, Fromm (perhaps unwittingly)
suggests a relationship between uncertainty and a search for meaning congenial to the
present thesis. Certainty may be accompanied by the lack of a search for meaning
(lacking not because individuals do not desire meaning, but because this desire has been
satisfied by certainty).
In conclusion, the uncertainty management assumption has received a great deal
of empirical support (for a review of this literature, see Van den Bos, 2009a). The core
underlying assertion of the uncertainty management literature posits that people carry a
deep seated drive to feel certainty pertaining to their general knowledge structures
(epistemic certainty) and self-relevant knowledge structures (existential certainty).
Certainty lends meaning to existence, sets expectations for future events, and guides
behavior (Hogg, 2007). As previously discussed, experiencing uncertainty is generally
aversive, and therefore, the psychological reaction to the experience of uncertainty is to
move away from it.
Uncertainty Management Perspectives: Points of Agreement and Contention
As with all families of interrelated theoretical perspectives, uncertainty
management models harbor a set of shared premises which unite them under common
themes. Here I use the term uncertainty management to refer to social psychological
theoretical perspectives which focus on the human motivation to reduce uncertainty.
Uncertainty management models find common ground in the assertion that uncertainty is
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tends to be experienced as aversive. Thus, people generally exhibit a drive toward
uncertainty reduction (Festinger, 1954; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Hogg and Mullin, 1999;
Lopes, 1987; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, and Tobin, 2001 Van den Bos, 2009a, Van Den
Bos, 2009b; Van Den Bos, 2004, Van Den Bos, 2012; Hogg & Blaylock, 2012).
Such perspectives generally posit that uncertainty is closely tied to insecurity,
control, and threat. Some models, such as Jost et al.’s (2003) uncertainty threat model of
system justification, tie uncertainty and threat specifically to political conservatism. Other
models, such as Hogg’s (2007) uncertainty identity theory, suggest that uncertainty
motivates rigid ideological views of any kind (for a similar perspective, see Greenberg
and Jonas, 2003).
Most uncertainty management perspectives suggest that some form of fluid
compensation or compensatory conviction process occurs in order to psychologically
reduce uncertainty (Hogg 2007; Jost et al., 2003; McGregor et al., 2001). According to
uncertainty identity theory, this is accomplished primarily by identification of the self
with a group, since they assert that the self is the critical reference point, or integrative
framework, of perception (Hogg, 2007). Other models, however, allow for fluid
compensation to occur with equal zealousness in any domain with which certainty about
expected relations between people, things, and ideas (e.g. meaning) can be affirmed,
including through the affirmation of cognitive schemata and cultural worldviews. In the
present thesis, I suggest that cognitively defaulting to the status quo is a predictable
psychological reaction to conditions of uncertainty, as a consideration of alternatives
opens the psychological gateway to uncertainty.
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Uncertainty management models may also differ in the specific type and scope of
uncertainty they intend to study. Some theorists prefer to focus on certainty of a highly
personal and self-relevant nature, directly related to chronic insecurity and anxiety, and
therefore place an emphasis upon the need to reduce personal as opposed to
informational uncertainty, or a more encompassing global uncertainty. Different models
may focus upon specific facets of uncertainty (e.g. death thoughts) or closely related
constructs (e.g. control, threat, anxiety), which overlap with the concept of uncertainty to
varying degrees (Van den Bos, 2009a, Van Den Bos, 2012, Hogg & Blaylock, 2012).
Early scholarship at the crossroads of psychology and economics, however, did not
specify any such hot cognitions for empirical effects which could now be described as
evidence of the uncertainty management assumption. Hence, I remain hesitant to narrow
the scope from which I am to investigate psychological uncertainty’s relation to the status
quo. A more global uncertainty might, for instance, activate a “fight, flight or freeze”
response which affects multiple fluid compensation processes simultaneously.
Related Theoretical Perspectives
The uncertainty management perspective proffered herein stems from a collage of
related theoretical conceptualizations. All uncertainty management models share the
common assumption that experiencing uncertainty causes individuals to seek or affirm
certainty through available means. This draws similarly with the central tenet of cognitive
dissonance theory, which posits that a cognitive inconsistency provokes the need to be
resolved or reduced. Some uncertainty theorists conceptualize cognitive dissonance as a
type of personal uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009a). Though they employ markedly
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different terminology, cognitive dissonance theory and uncertainty management theories
serve to explain many of the same phenomena in a strikingly similar manner.
Self Affirmation Theory (Steele, 1988) posits that people cope with dissonance by
engaging in a process of fluid compensation, whereby the negative effects of an
inconsistency in one domain can be ameliorated by psychologically emphasizing
consistency in another self-relevant domain. This “hydraulic” compensatory model is
also endorsed by most uncertainty management theorists and provides a cogent
conceptual mechanism for how uncertainty is managed. The premise of fluid
compensation applies to uncertainty management such that the negative effects of
uncertainty in one domain can be ameliorated by affirming certainty in another domain.
The compensatory conviction model of uncertainty reduction (McGregor et al., 2001),
presents the idea of fluid compensation, which states that individuals respond to
uncertainty threats by holding stronger to the worldviews which provide structure,
meaning, and comfort in their lives (see Hogg and Blaylock, 2012, for a review).
The affirmation of cultural worldviews and values ameliorates the negative
experience associated with uncertainty because cultural worldviews and values are, in a
generalized fashion, affirmative of epistemic and existential certainty. That is to say,
cultural worldviews and values convey knowledge and meaning regarding relations
between the self, others, and experiences in the social world, and are therefore
epistemically and existentially palliative. This perspective is deeply influenced by the
Meaning Maintenance Model (Proulx, 2012), pp. 82, which posits that “when mental
representations of expected associations are violated by unexpected experiences, people
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experience an uncomfortable arousal state that evokes the affirmation of alternative
expected associations.”
The uncertainty threat model was formulated as an account of what motivates
individuals to cling to political conservatism and endorse system justifying behavior, and
its hypotheses can be seen as an extension of system justification theory. Therefore,
theories which focus directly on uncertainty management share much common with a
system justification perspective. Indeed, many such ideas are incorporated into the
current model, in which I assert that uncertainty directly relates to status quo preference
(which is, according to system justification theorists, one of the two core components of
political conservatism). Similarly, terror management theory was formulated as an
account of the psychological reaction to existentially threatening thoughts of one’s own
death. As will soon be discussed in the subsequent section, mortality salience can in some
respects be conceptualized as a special case manifestation of global uncertainty. The
above discussed theoretical models are perspectives which help us understand the
mechanics of uncertainty management models and how uncertainty might ultimately
relate to our dependent variable of interest: status quo preference.
Uncertainty and Related Constructs
Uncertainty’s close synonyms. Unpredictability and uncontrollability are two
words which share a great deal of conceptual overlap with uncertainty, so much so that
we consider them to be relatively core aspects of the construct of uncertainty. It is
difficult to imagine a stimulus which invokes uncertainty without also invoking
unpredictability or uncontrollability, and their social cognitive connotations are thus
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jointly overlapping. Unpredictability and controllability may be considered as categorical
features or subsets of uncertainty. A plethora of social psychological research
demonstrates that people are motivated to perceive the world as predictable and
controllable, and much of this research comfortably merges with the extant research on
uncertainty (Allport, 1966; Kay et al. 2007; Van den Bos, 2009a, Plaks, Grant & Dweck,
2005).
Since unpredictability and uncontrollability are so intimately grafted to the
construct of uncertainty in this way, we shall therefore not attempt to demonstrate that
uncertainty influences outcomes independent of unpredictability and uncontrollability in
the present experiments. Doing so would likely engender difficult to interpret data, as
manipulating a construct and then statistically controlling for the effects of the
manipulation is typically not recommended. In future research, the task of empirically
and disentangling uncertainty from unpredictability and uncontrollability may be of
interest, though such a task would be a relatively minor point in the context of the
theoretical goals of the present studies.
Unpredictability is a narrower subset within the broader construct of uncertainty.
It is the future oriented aspect of uncertainty, as the word “predict” suggests an appraisal
about future events, while the more global uncertainty can pertain to the present or past,
and may therefore exclude notions of predictability. Uncontrollability is a narrower
subset within the broader construct of unpredictability (and therefore, also uncertainty).
There exist events which cannot be controlled by the perceiver yet can be predicted with
scientific exactitude, such as political outcomes, weather outcomes, and the outcomes of
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scientific research studies themselves. Control suggests the appraisal that one can affect
outcomes. Some theorists suggest that that lack of control is associated with feelings of
personal uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Van den Bos, 2001).
Control, however, may not be necessary or sufficient for uncertainty management
effects to manifest. Many extreme uncertainty reducing ideologies and worldviews, for
instance, relinquish personal control to external institutions and/or supernatural entities,
while others emphasize agentic individualism. The psychological drive toward
uncertainty management may be part of an evolutionarily ingrained mindset, set in
motion by humanity’s quest for knowledge in the service of bettering one’s odds of
survival. More directly, such processes may be seen as products of classical conditioning
and/or the combined effect of various social, cognitive, and behavioral mechanisms.
Social cognitive appraisals associated with uncertainty. Insecurity, threat, and
anxiety are three constructs which may share a great deal of conceptual an experiential
overlap with uncertainty, yet remain conceptually distinct from it. First it is important to
note that each of these terms is unavoidably negative in connotation. The word insecurity
has a long history in psychology, and tends to hold a personal connotation regarding
expected relations between the self and others. In the attachment theory literature,
insecure attachment styles tend to result from inconsistent caregiving behaviors, and may
ultimately induce self-directed uncertainty and associated negative traits, such as low
self-esteem (Bowlby 1969; 1973). Thus, insecurity appears to be both self-directed (e.g
.personal), negative, and associated with uncertainties. Van den Bos (2009b) additionally
asserts that insecurity has a more “chronic connotation” and that, “In a new social
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context, most people would feel uncertain about what to do, but those with strong selfsecurity would probably be thinking they could learn what was needed and then be fine,
whereas those with low levels of self-security might think that others were looking down
on them.” Insecurity is more emotional compared to personal uncertainty (and therefore
also global uncertainty) (Sverke & Hellgren, 2002).An insecure person might be
described as harboring doubts about their skills and abilities (Murray, Holmes, & Collins,
2006). Like insecurity, threat, is also connotatively negative, and often accompanies the
experience of uncertainty (Jost et al 2003a; Van den Bos, 2009a, 2009b).
Threat tends to be construed as a situational appraisal while insecurity tends to be
construed as a personality level appraisal, though some individuals may be chronically
threatened, just as insecurity may be situation-specific. Threat is likely to elicit safety
seeking behavior. Indeed, need for safety is activated by threat appraisals (Sloan, &
Telch, 2002). Some programs of uncertainty management research focus on “personal
uncertainty,” in which threat is more directly implicated (relative to global uncertainty;
Van den Bos, 2009). Anxiety is an affective state which many theorists implicate as
related to, insecurity, threat, and uncertainty (Anson et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2003a).
Uncertainty may elicit threat appraisals, which cause anxiety.
Anxiety is a negatively valenced emotional state which includes fear,
apprehension, and worry (Rosen & Schulkin 1998). Anxiety can be described as
exhibiting cognitive, emotional, behavioral and physiological components. Anxiety is
closely related to threat, as diffuse elements of danger tend to be present in the experience
of anxiety (Seligman, Walker, & Rosenhan, 2001). Developmental psychology research
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also indicates that anxiety disorders are related to a sense of control (Barlow, 2000).
Freud (1936) recognized anxiety as a threatening "signal of danger" which causes
individuals to engage in defense mechanisms. See Table 1 for a chart of key
distinguishing features among the concepts described above.
Table 1. Uncertainty and Related Constructs
Related constructsa

Distinguishing points
Relatively proximal to global uncertainty

Unpredictability

 Unpredictability may be looked at as a component or subset within the
broader construct of uncertainty.
 It is the future/outcome oriented aspect of uncertainty.

Uncontrollability

 Uncontrollability may be looked at as a component or subset within the
broader construct of unpredictability.
 There are cases when one can accurately predict, but not control an
outcome.
Relatively more distal to global uncertainty

a

Threat

 Situational connotation.
 Acutely experienced.
 Relatively intense and stimulus specific.

Insecurity






Mortality salience/Death
thought accessibility

 Stimulus specific towards thoughts about death.
 Narrower (more local as opposed to global) theoretical breadth
compared to Uncertainty Management literature.

Anxiety

 Primarily thought of as an affective state, yet exhibits all of cognitive,
emotional, behavioral and physiological components.
 Anxiety correlates with a breadth of negative affective states, including
of fear, apprehension, and worry.
 Exhibits a range of presentations from acute to diffuse; across varying
situations, times, and persons.

Self-emotional connotation.
Often analyzed at the personality-level.
A cognitive-emotional evaluation of a feeling state.
This includes components of “uncertainty or anxiety about oneself;
lack of confidence” (Merriam-Webster, 2015).
 Insecurity implies feelings of being “not protected,” “nervous and
uncomfortable.” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015)

We shall not attempt to demonstrate that uncertainty influences outcomes independent of these constructs.
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Uncertainty and mortality salience. Due to Uncertainty Management and Terror
Management perspectives’ shared theoretical territory (namely, their relation to the above
constructs, as well Meaning Maintenance and System Justification perspectives), some
scholarship has taken a look at the relation between the constructs of uncertainty and
mortality salience (Van den Bos 2004, Van den Bos, 2009a, Anson et al. 2009). Both
camps would be in agreement that uncertainty is to be considered a broader and more
inclusive construct than the narrower construct of mortality salience. Terror Management
theorists suggest that a key consequence of uncertainty salience is the activation of death
related thought (Anson et al., 2009). Conversely, Uncertainty Management theorists
suggest that a key consequence of mortality salience is the activation of uncertainty
related thoughts (Van den Bos 2004; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).
Both death thoughts and uncertainty salience are tied to each of the related
constructs discussed in the previous section, in extremely similar ways. From an
Uncertainty Management perspective, primes of mortality salience can be viewed as a
kind of indirect manipulation of uncertainty, which is believed to be the more central
psychological construct of the two in respect to dependent phenomena of their mutual
interest. Van den Bos (2004) reasoned that if this were the case, then it naturally would
follow that compared to a mortality salience manipulation, an uncertainty salience
manipulation should more directly affect the dependent variable of mutual interest, in this
case “cultural worldviews.”
Indeed, when comparing the effects of an uncertainty salience versus mortality
salience manipulation upon an identical dependent variable assessing cultural
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worldviews, using identical methods and procedure, uncertainty salience tends to produce
the strongest effects (Van den Bos 2004; Van den Bos et al. 2005, Van den Bos 2004).
Such research provides empirical support for the claim that the relatively “local”
psychological processes implicated in terror management theory are superseded or
engulfed by more global ones (i.e. uncertainty management). Van den Bos (2004) make
important note that, “I hasten to note that, in my opinion, all this should not necessarily
be taken as a refutation of terror management theory, but, rather, an attempt to
incorporate at least some elements of it into a broader framework.”
Van den Bos (2004) further states,
I would like to stress that I am not saying here that the research findings that were
reviewed in this chapter imply that uncertainty concerns underlie all terror
management effects. In all likelihood, I would predict that future research will
show that nonexistence does have a motivational force, over and beyond the
uncertainty aspects that may be related to reminders of mortality, and I am
therefore not arguing that fear of termination of life, nonexistence, and decay are
just side effects of uncertainty with no motivational properties. There are no data
that speak to this latter position, and personally I think that it would be
unreasonable to expect that in the future there will be data that will show this.
(p. 178)
Some elements of terror management theory may be part of a broader theoretical
framework related to uncertainty management, while other elements of the theory are
uniquely associated with the psychology of death. Both terror management and
uncertainty management perspectives address issues related to the veneration of cultural
worldviews, system justification, and a host of related constructs (such as those discussed
in the previous sections). These similar elements may therefore harbor shared
implications regarding their effects upon status quo preference. Both conceptually and
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empirically, it appears that the uncertainty management framework may be better suited
to describe the present phenomena of interest.
General Conclusions
The diverse array of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence reviewed
above appears to advance a theoretical position which asserts that humans harbor a deep
seated need to manage uncertainty. Uncertainty management models assert that since
uncertainty tends to accompany negative experiential cognitive and affective states, it
must be psychologically reduced. From a symbolic perspective, “uncertainty” represents
the unknown or other, and is associated with negative qualities. Conversely, certainty
represents the known or similar, and is associated with positive qualities. According to
uncertainty management models, individuals are motivated to invoke a variety of social
and cognitive mechanisms in order to reduce feelings of uncertainty.

CHAPTER THREE
OVERVIEW OF THEORY, HYPOTHESES,
AND METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY
Theoretical Assertions and Goals
I hypothesize that psychological support for the status quo is a direct and potent
mechanism of subjective uncertainty reduction. Reality (that which exists, the status quo)
is psychologically connected with “the known” in contrast to its alternative, which is
connected with “the unknown.” Knowledge and meaning can be derived from that which
is known or certain; while these qualities cannot be derived from that which is unknown
or uncertain. Thus, a challenge to one’s sense of certainty is poised to result in an
increased preference for the status quo, in the service of motivated uncertainty reduction.
In its most skeletal form, my theoretical framework posits the following
premises.1) Humans fundamentally seek the affirmation of expected relations (meaning)
in the social and material world, rooted in an innate desire to know the world (epistemic
motivation) and the self’s relation to it (existential motivation). 2) Uncertainty is
antithetical to this goal. 3) The experience of heightened uncertainty, therefore, produces
a psychological response which motivates the individual to reduce it by affirming
meaning (expected relations) by available psychological means. Extending from a
conceptual synthesis of these premises, I uniquely posit that 4) in the face of uncertainty,
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individuals experience a heightened desire to affirm the status quo (that which signifies
tangible reality, without which meaning would be impossible to conceive).
Herein, I adopt a theoretical perspective which proposes that the need to maintain
certainty compels people to cling to ideologies and worldviews which bolster the known
and certain; the binding thread of which is best captured by the term status quo. I should
also note that due to variation in terminology over time, some theorists (Fromm 1949;
1994) might prefer to use the term existential in describing this uncertainty, while more
recent scholarship speaks of nearly identical principles in terms of epistemic certainty
(Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). Regardless, most if not all parties engaged in this line of
inquiry would agree that epistemic and existential certainty shine from the same source
and/or represent different approaches toward understanding the same root phenomena of
humankind’s search for knowledge and meaning in the social world. I do not set out to
empirically distinguish between epistemic vs. existential uncertainty in the present
research project, in part due to the idiosyncratic nature of how these terms relate to one
another in the lexicon of social psychology, though this issue may attract further
investigation by interested parties.
Distinction Between Present Approach and Previous Work
I intend to establish a direct cause-effect relationship between uncertainty
management needs and status quo preference by empirically demonstrating that
experimental manipulations of uncertainty foster heightened endorsements of the status
quo, as manifested by several measures.
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A variety of studies suggest that “epistemic” and “existential” needs compel
people toward system justifying policies and movements, yet this line of research is
correlational, not experimental (Hennes et al. 2012). Moreover, existing research
demonstrates that challenging one’s cultural worldviews causally relates to status quo
reference (Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius, van der Toorn, & Bratt, 2012; for a
review, see Jost & Napier, 2012), yet the focus of these studies is unrelated to either
uncertainty management or mortality salience.
The empirical research reviewed in the previous chapters strongly suggests a link
between psychological uncertainty and conservative (or “system justifying”) values, of
which preference for the status quo can be considered a central component (Jost et al.
2003). Notably however, the (Jost et al. 2003) review made its case almost entirely based
upon correlational evidence. Additionally, there exists research demonstrating that
mortality salience and uncertainty salience each independently affect attitudes toward
cherished cultural norms and values, though the authors fail to mention any tie ins to the
concept of status quo preference (For a review, see Van den Bos, 2004). Moreover, the
theoretical implications of these studies are hotly contested; even over a decade after the
inception of theoretical claims within the field regarding the conceptualization of, and
interrelation between, the constructs of uncertainty, mortality salience, and cultural
worldviews.
There are a variety of explanations for why this might be the case. As argued by
Jost et al. (2004), various conceptual perspectives regarding both the constructs and
formulation of the specific research questions of interest make it “Extremely difficult to
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empirically distinguish between proximal fears that are related versus unrelated to the
fear of death,” (p. 268) in relation to political ideology and cultural worldviews. The
“extreme difficulty” of this task is debatable, but may require methods other than those
used by Jost and colleagues, such as utilizing true experiments, comparing side by side
manipulations of the focal constructs, or controlling for the effects of the purportedly
lesser variable, to name a few possible strategies. Various theorists conceptualize and
define these constructs differently, often opting for the conceptual definition and
overarching theoretical perspective which aligns most harmoniously with their own body
of empirical findings. Unfortunately, when a large majority of evidence in favor of a
theory is offered by the researchers who conceptualized it, it is difficult to divorce this
self-interested aspect of one’s perspective when careers and scientific legacies are on the
line. Thus, outsider perspectives proffered by researchers who don’t have a personal stake
in the outcome of these debates stand to contribute greatly to the understanding of such
concepts, which are rather wide in breadth and difficult to pin down with succinct
conceptual definitions fully accepted by all interested parties.
In the process of synthesizing such empirical and theoretical observations,
questions naturally arise pertaining to 1) the specification of the fundamental construct(s)
underlying the need to seek meaning and 2) how the quest to seek meaning tangibly
affects social judgments of real consequence. To address the former question, I have
suggested that uncertainty plays a central role in motivating individuals to seek meaning.
To address the latter question, I have suggested that the status quo, which connotes the
known and certain, is a direct conduit by which individuals move away from uncertainty
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and towards certainty. Insofar as the status quo is a particularly direct mode of
uncertainty reduction, it is no coincidence then that evaluations of the status quo are both
deeply affected by uncertainty and also are of weighty societal consequence. In order to
demonstrate such a theoretical proposition, the primary task is to empirically demonstrate
a cause-effect relationship between experimentally manipulated uncertainty (and
mortality salience) and various indices of status quo preference (a methodology which to
my knowledge no researcher has yet attempted).
The prior scholarship reviewed strongly implies such a relationship, linking
uncertainty to the status quo by degrees of separation with respect to related constructs.
Yet, a direct conceptual tie between the two constructs lacks to be established
empirically, despite the recognition of this connection enjoying a rich theoretical history
in the philosophical tradition of existentialism, corroborated by contemporary empirical
evidence consistent with its premises. Therefore, a direct causal link begs to be
established with regards to thoughts about uncertainty and status quo preference.
I discussed earlier how Van den Bos and colleagues applied their broader, more
global theoretical perspective to synthesize and interpret previous empirical research
conducted in the name of terror management theory. They posited that uncertainty, being
the more central construct, would outpace mortality salience with respect to the predicted
effect shared by both theories. This is because mortality salience, they hypothesized, was
to some extent an indirect prime of uncertainty. Van den Bos and colleagues posited
uncertainty itself (and not specifically death uncertainty) to be the core construct of
interest with regards to meaning maintenance via the endorsement of cultural
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worldviews. In this way, their theoretical framework offered itself as broader in
application and more direct in effects produced when compared to terror management
theory. Van den Bos and colleagues suggest that some evidence offered in support terror
management theory can also be construed as indirect evidence of uncertainty
management perspectives. An experiment was then concocted in order to establish a case
for direct causal evidence in support of their account. Analogously, the heretofore
reviewed evidence which we interpret to be in support of our uncertainty account of
status quo preference is at present only indirect evidence of its existence. A direct causal
demonstration remains to be empirically established.
Specifically, in relation to the extant studies, there are currently no known studies
in which both uncertainty and mortality salience are manipulated experimentally, with
dependent variables addressing the construct of status quo preference. This sets the
current experiments apart from previous studies which: a) do not employ experimental
manipulations b) investigate the relation between mortality salience and death with no
reference to status quo preference and c) investigate status quo preference without
reference to one of the variables (mortality salience or uncertainty). Our most
fundamental theoretical claim is that heightened uncertainty salience causes an increase
in preference for the status quo, and that such an effect is not due solely to other
psychological constructs potentially activated by uncertainty salience manipulations, such
as mortality salience, but also feelings such as insecurity, threat, and anxiety potentially
triggered by these constructs.
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Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty Engenders Preference for Status Quo
Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that heightened uncertainty salience (situationally
manipulated) causes an increase in preference for the status quo, broadly construed.
While a variety of heretofore reviewed empirical evidence can be interpreted as
consistent with this general hypothesis, this core proposition awaits to be directly
empirically tested in the context of the theoretical perspective expounded upon herein,
with status quo preference as the outcome variable. This model uniquely proposes that
motivated status quo preference is directly tied to psychologically deep-seated
uncertainty management drives, such that manipulating uncertainty salience should result
in heighted status quo preference.
Hypothesis 2: Multiplicative Dispositional Hypotheses
Hypothesis 2 (H2) further posits that various moderating factors, including
generalized individual differences in general appraisals of uncertainty, system justifying
attitudes and worldviews, and non-ideological sociopolitical indicators will magnify the
core effects as predicted by hypothesis 1. That is to say, I hypothesize that high levels of
chronic uncertainty will increase participant sensitivity to the experimental manipulation,
magnifying the size of the predicted effect of the uncertainty manipulation (H1).
However, it is alternately possible that individuals possessing high levels of
chronic uncertainty may be relatively less affected by the experimental manipulation as
specified by H1, if such individuals’ uncertainty already resides at a near-ceiling level.
Herein lie two complementary sets of hypotheses regarding the size and direction of the
effects of H1, when entering moderators into the equation. The former hypothesis (H2) is
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that which is expected, while the latter (H2’s) subordinate hypothesis may provide a
fruitful explanation if evidence for H2 is not garnered.
Hypothesis 2(x). The three sets of Hypotheses 2(x, y, z) are essentially analogous
in structure, with each (x, y, z) indicating the different conceptual categories of the
moderators (appraisals of uncertainty, system justifying attitudes and worldviews, and
non-ideological sociopolitical indicators respectively). Thus, nested within H2 is H2(x),
which specifically posits that individual differences in generalized appraisals of
uncertainty will magnify the core effects predicted by H1. Stated otherwise, H2(x)
predicts that individuals for whom uncertainty and closely related concepts are
chronically accessible and/or highly negative, the effects of situationally induced
uncertainty upon status quo preference will be magnified.
I have presently chosen two crucial, well established measures to assess different
aspects of this larger construct (uncertainty appraisals). The first is the Intolerance of
Uncertainty Scale (IUS), which measures a generalized intolerance or aversion toward
uncertainty (Buhr, & Dugas, 2002). The IUS exhibits a four-factor structure representing
the degree to which uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, uncertainty leads to the
inability to act, uncertain events are negative and should be avoided, and uncertainty is
associated with unfairness. Sample items include: “Uncertainty makes me uneasy,
anxious, or stressed.” and “It’s unfair having no guarantees in life.” Second is the highly
similar Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (IAS), which was designed to assess self-report
attitudes toward ambiguity, defining “ambiguous” situations as those which cannot be
“adequately structured or categorized due to of insufficient cues” (Budner, 1962). Sample
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items include, “An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't
know too much.” and “People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how
complicated things really are.”
Hypothesis 2(y). Analogously, nested within H2 is H2(y), which specifically
suggests that system justifying attitudes and worldviews will magnify the core effects
predicted by H1. It is this hypothesis which underlies the theoretical core of this
dissertation. I have presently chosen six measures to assess different aspects of this larger
construct. First is a basic measure of left-right political ideology. Next is the American
System Justification Scale (SJS) (Kay & Jost, 2003). The SJS was designed to indicate
"perceptions of the fairness, legitimacy, and justifiability of the prevailing social system"
(Kay & Jost, 2003, p. 828). Sample items include: “In general, the American political
system operates as it should.” and “American society needs to be radically restructured.
Additionally, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was measured with the SDO-6 scale,
which includes items such as: “It would be good if groups could be equal.” (reverse
coded) and “It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups
are at the bottom.” Additionally, I include the most recent version of the Belief in a Just
World (BJW) scale, which is intended to measure the extent to which individuals believe
in a just world (i.e. a world where people get what they deserve, a fair and just world;
Lucas, Zhdanova, & Alexander, 2011). This scale contains items such as: “I feel that
other people generally earn the rewards and punishments they get in this world.” “Other
people usually use fair procedures in dealing with others.” “I generally deserve the things
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I am accorded.” and “I feel that people generally use methods that are fair in their
evaluation of me.”
Hypothesis 2(z). Analogously, nested within H2 is H2(z), which specifically
suggests that non-ideological sociopolitical factors will moderate the core effects
predicted by H1. This set of hypotheses is primarily exploratory in nature, and this
variable grouping consists of items such as political participation and attention to politics.
Each of these measures has been previously validated, and each scale mentioned consists
of only one or two items. Thus, though this list sounds time consuming, this section
consists of no more than 13 items, the typical length of a single scale.
The “interactive” approaches heretofore described under the heading
“Multiplicative Dispositional Hypotheses” posit that individual differences with regards
to a variety of thematically connected psychological construct groupings interact with
situational primes of uncertainty in a non-additive, but rather multiplicative manner. For
example, individuals high in aversion toward uncertainty are hypothesized to be more
“reactive” to situational conditions priming uncertainty, thus magnifying their preexisting attitudes and proclivities.
Summarizing the above, we hypothesize that the effects described in Hypothesis 1
will be strongest among those for whom uncertainty and ambiguity are particularly
distressing, since these individuals are expected to possess a greater innate need to
engage in palliative, uncertainty reducing cognitive processes (i.e. those resulting in
greater status quo preference) [H2(x)]. Analogously, adherence to system justifying
worldviews is hypothesized to magnify the effects of primed uncertainty upon status quo
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preference H2(y); our primary variable grouping of interest. Similarly, we hypothesize
that non-ideological socio political indicators, may moderate the relation between the
primes and dependent variables in an analogous fashion, though predictions in this
variable grouping [H2(z)] are primarily exploratory, lacking previous theoretical
establishment. The basic prediction here is that individuals who feel more politically
involved (high attention, interest, et cetera) should exhibit a magnification/polarization of
attitudes since they have the largest personal stake/self-identification with the content
area at hand.
Hypothesis 3: Additive Dispositional Hypotheses
Alternatively, whereas the hypotheses outlined above presume an interaction of
the dispositional variables with the situationally manipulated independent variable
(uncertainty and mortality salience primes), Hypotheses 3(x), 3(y), and 3(z) predict that
the effects of the dispositional variables will combine additively (but not multiplicatively)
with the effect of the prime to produce status quo preference). While the “additive” vs.
“multiplicative” distinction may seem tedious, it is specified here in order to thoroughly
characterize the structure of the underlying process mechanisms generating the effects of
interest. I gauge the underlying mechanisms as being more consistent with a
multiplicative structure as described in the previous section, though the possibility of a
merely additive model may also be noted. In other words, the additive hypotheses are not
specifically predicted, but serve as a counterpoint to the multiplicative hypotheses
outlined above.
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H3 and subsequent nested hypotheses are directionally consistent with the H2
hypotheses stated above, yet predict only simple effects of the situational and
dispositional IV’s, without significant interaction effects (in the context of a hierarchical
linear regression data analysis approach, significance at Step1[main effects], but not Step
2[interactive/multiplicative effects]). If the additive (non-interactive) perspective is
correct, each of these simple effects (corresponding to the variables in the three families
of dispositional effects [the moderator variables], and the uncertainty prime) would exert
themselves independently of one another. Thus, the moderator would not
magnify/polarize attitudinal differences resulting from the prime, but rather contribute in
an additive manner with the influence of the primes in predicting the dependent variables.
Hypothesis 3(x). Nested within H3 is H3(x), which specifically posits that
individual differences in generalized appraisals of uncertainty will be directly correlated
with status quo preference, while not affecting the magnitude of any effects produced by
the uncertainty prime.
Hypothesis 3(y). Nested within H3 is H3(y), which specifically posits that
individual differences in system justifying attitudes and worldviews will be directly
correlated with status quo preference, while not affecting the magnitude of any effects
produced by the uncertainty prime.
Hypothesis 3(z). Nested within H3 is H3(z), which specifically posits that
individual differences in sociopolitical indicators will be directly correlated with status
quo preference, while not affecting the magnitude of any effects produced by the
uncertainty prime.
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Control and Mediating Variables
All previously mentioned predictions will first be tested for the raw effect,
without entering control variables or testing for mediation. Second, these hypotheses will
be tested controlling for the four “Thoughts and Feelings Measures” (see Appendix) in
the regression model. Note that “controls” refers to these measures, while “control
condition” refers to participants randomly assigned to the control prime. These four
measures entail asking the participants the degree to which they thought about or felt:
“death and dying,” “anxious,” “insecure,” and “threatened.” Lastly, each of the
moderational regression models was tested for mediated moderation criteria with the
“thoughts and feelings measures.” Since it is not possible to test for mediated moderation
when the same variable serves both as a control and a mediator, the mediational tests of
moderation were performed without controls.
The initial reason for including the “thoughts and feelings measures” was for
them to be looked at as control variables, with the mediational tests largely being an
afterthought. We expect the “with controls” analyses to demonstrate that any effects of
uncertainty on status quo preference remain significant even after controlling for these
measures. Additionally, replicating prior research, the Positive Affect Negative Affect
Scale (PANAS) will be measured “to find out whether unintended effects of the salience
manipulation on the positive and negative subsets are found.” (Van den Bos et al. 2005,
p. 96). The inclusion of this scale following the prime can also be said to operate as both
a time delay, and possible filler task.
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Hypotheses Overview
Core hypotheses.
H1.

Uncertainty/Mortality Salience (situationally manipulated) →Status Quo
Preference

H2.

Multiplicative Dispositional Hypotheses. Moderating factors expected to
magnify the effect specified by H1.

Interactive hypotheses.
H2x.

Uncertainty Salience * Generalized appraisals of uncertainty → Status
Quo Preference

H2y.

Uncertainty Salience * System justifying attitudes and worldviews
→Status Quo Preference

H2z.

Uncertainty Salience * (non- ideological) sociopolitical indicators
→Status Quo Preference

Additive dispositional hypotheses.
H3x.

Uncertainty Salience + Generalized appraisals of uncertainty → Status
Quo Preference

H3y.

Uncertainty Salience + System justifying attitudes and worldviews →
Status Quo Preference

H3z.

Uncertainty Salience + (non- ideological) sociopolitical indicators→
Status Quo Preference

Following from these hypotheses, I shall perform two experiments. Experiment 1
will employ a manipulation with three conditions: uncertainty salience, mortality
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salience, and control group salience (essentially identical to the setup employed by Van
den Bos et al., 2005, utilizing the Life Event Inventory (LEI) method (see Appendix).
The moderating variables previously discussed will be additionally included, along with
the controls and tests of mediation to be described. After Experiment 1, a pilot test will be
performed to field different methods of priming the experimentally manipulated mental
states in a manner different from the LEI. Experiment 2 will then utilize this different
method of uncertainty, mortality salience, and control induction, testing the same
hypotheses as Experiment 1; a near replication with variation in the independent variable
priming method.

CHAPTER FOUR
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was primarily conceived to test core hypothesis (H1) and variations,
which state that uncertainty (situationally manipulated) triggers heightened levels of
status quo preference. This hypothesis remains to be conceived and tested as such.
Furthermore, the moderational/interactive hypotheses will demonstrate the degree to
which individual difference variables related to the three moderator variable groupings of
uncertainty appraisals (H2x), system justifying attitudes and worldviews (H2y) and other
non-ideological social and political variables (H2z) influence any relation between our
prime and the dependent variables, representing various facets of status quo preference.
Such research questions and their methodological operationalization as described herein
build upon the previous studies cited, yet are in themselves novel and a logical step
forward in the investigation of such issues, allowing for new insights into established
theoretical perspectives such as the Uncertainty Management and System Justification
theories.
Design
This experiment included one manipulated categorical independent variable with
three between subject levels (uncertainty salience, mortality salience, control), a battery
of the thirteen continuous moderators to be fielded as second independent variable in
successive models, and a hybrid measure of “thoughts and feelings” pertaining to threat,
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insecurity, death, and anxiety serving as controls in the appropriate “with controls”
models (see Appendix for these measures as they appear). The dependent variable
consisted of three distinct assessments of status quo preference as gauged via three scales
triangulating the construct; including Status Quo Preference Scale (higher values
indicating higher preference), Attitudes Towards Reformers (higher values indicating
more negative attitudes) and Support for Regime Change (higher values indicating more
support).
Independent variable manipulation. In the first experiment, I manipulated
uncertainty in a manner operationally identical to that of the uncertainty salience priming
procedure introduced by Van den Bos (2001), based on prior uncertainty management
studies (For a review, see Van den Bos, 2005, 2009). According to this procedure,
participants are asked the following: a) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of being uncertain arouses in you” and (b) “Please write down, as specifically as
you can, what you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain.” This
manipulation has been extensively utilized within the uncertainty management literature
and has firmly demonstrated itself to be a valid and effectual method for inducing state
uncertainty. In addition to the uncertainty condition, I manipulated mortality salience in
the same manner as Van den Bos et al. (2005), who was the first to compare the effects of
manipulations of uncertainty salience and mortality salience side by side.
The uncertainty manipulation introduced by Van den Bos (2001) was structurally
based upon the mortality salience prime most commonly found in the terror management
literature (Greenberg et al. 1997). The original terror management manipulation asked
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participants the following: (a) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of
your death arouses in you” and (b) “Please write down, as specifically as you can, what
you think physically will happen to you as you die.” The Van den Bos et al. (2001)
uncertainty manipulation simply reads “(a) Please briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of your being uncertain arouses in you. (b) Please write down, as specifically as
you can, what you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain. The control
condition reads (a) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your
watching TV arouses in you. (b) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you
think physically will happen to you as you watch TV.”
This mortality salience manipulation pairs well with the uncertainty manipulation,
as explained by van Den Bos et al. (2005),
By thus replacing “death” with “uncertain” in the most commonly used
manipulation of terror management theory, while leaving everything else the
same, the uncertainty salience manipulation was constructed in such a way that it
very closely resembled the mortality salience manipulation. As a result, the
impact of these two manipulations on people's reactions toward transgressions
and affirmation of important cultural norms and values could be investigated in a
way that yielded a very clean and hence meaningful comparison between the two
manipulations.
Dependent measures. I employed three dependent variables indexing important
aspects of status quo preference. First employed is the Status Quo Preference Scale,
originally developed by myself for use in a separate line of research. It has subsequently
been modified, with a reduction in the number of items from its original 16 down to 9
items. This was done by running a reliability analysis (Cronbach, 1951) on the original 16
items, and removing the item which, if removed, would result in the greatest increase in
the overall alpha coefficient of the scale. This procedure was recursively applied one item
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at a time until the scale’s alpha coefficient rose above the .70 level, generally recognized
as “good” reliability. The resulting status quo preference scale contains 9 items with
Cronbach’s alpha = .736. Sample items in this scale include: “Change is in life is
necessary for success.” and “Change in life usually comes with great costs” (see
Appendix for the scale as it appears).
The second dependent measure, Attitudes Towards Reformers is included, as
O’Brien and Crandall (2005) make the case that that negatively judging social actors who
engage in reform represents a key component in the social cognition of status quo
preference. This scale contains six short items, including “Those who protest the political
system are usually looking for handouts and unrealistic quick fixes.” and “Those who
attempt to reform the system usually have ulterior motives.” The third and final
dependent measure, Support for Regime Change, contains six items gauging agreement
with a variety of statements regarding attitudes towards Regime Change. Sample items
include “I like to see government change their leaders often, rather than rarely.” and
“When the political rulers of a country become ineffective, they should be removed
swiftly.” These three scales, including the 9 item status quo preference scale, the 6 item
attitudes towards reformers scale, and the 6 item support for regime change scale,
compose the entirety of the dependent variable battery.
Positive and Negative Affect Scale. As in Van den Bos et al. (2005), the Positive
Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), were
measured “to find out whether unintended effects of the salience manipulation on the
positive and negative subsets are found” (p. 96). This scale is composed of two 10-item
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subscales addressing the factors of positive and negative affect. As demonstrated by prior
researchers utilizing this same procedure (e.g. Jost, J. T., Chaikalis-Petritsis, V., Abrams,
D., Sidanius, J., Toorn, J. van der, & Bratt, C. ,2012; Van den Bos et al., 2006), we
hypothesized that the uncertainty manipulation will have no effect upon either subscale of
the PANAS. Thus, in accordance with precedent set by prior research, we predicted that
this manipulation check would demonstrate that mere positive or negative affect cannot
be held responsible for any effects of the prime upon the dependent measures. This
allows us to assert that the experimental manipulation exerts its effects upon the
dependent variables as a result of uncertainty’s proposed psychological functions as
outlined in this dissertation, and not simply by uncertainty changing global positive or
negative affective.
Manipulation check, control, and potential mediating variables.
Subsequently, the three manipulation check items were administered, in which
participants were asked the extent to which they thought about: uncertainty, death, or
television (the control topic). These three questions served as the manipulation check
questions, as they reflect thoughts corresponding to the three randomly assigned
experimental conditions (see Appendix). Next, the four “thoughts and feelings measures”
were assessed, asking participants the extent to which: “I thought about or felt death and
dying,” “I thought about or felt anxious.” “I thought about or felt insecure.” and “I
thought about or felt threatened.” These four variables serve as the control variables for
the “with controls” regression models; and alternatively serve as potential mediators in
the mediational models.
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Measures of moderating variables. The moderators introduced previously
appear here. These variables tend to cluster into the three conceptual categories,
“uncertainty appraisals,” “system justifying attitudes and worldviews” and “nonideological sociopolitical indicators.”
Individual difference measures.
Uncertainty appraisals.
M1.

UIS (Uncertainty Intolerance Scale)

M2.

IAS (Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale)

System justifying attitudes and worldviews.
M3.

(SJS) System Justification Scale

M4.

SDO (Social Dominance Orientation)

M5.

Belief in a Just World Scale

M6.

Political Ideology (liberal vs. conservative)

M7.

Partisanship (Party Identification)

Sociopolitical indicators (non-ideological). (Note: Each of the following are 1 or
2 item measures).
M8.

Trust in Government

M9.

Political Self-Efficacy

M10. Political Interest
M11. Political Attention
M12. Knowledge
M13. Voting intention
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Participants and Procedure
Participants were accessed and recruited via Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online
research recruitment tool which offers quick access to a representative, non-university
sample. 194 American individuals participated in the study arranged through Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Participants were informed that they will be asked to perform tasks
such as writing about personal experiences, in addition to reporting a variety of their own
opinions and attitudes. Experimental materials were administered on participants’ home
computers, using a securely encrypted third party service for data acquisition and storage
accessible only to the primary investigator. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions (uncertainty, mortality salience, control). The survey questionnaires were
presented in the following order: Random assignment to IV condition, PANAS, DVs,
manipulation checks, controls and mediators, potential moderating variables.
Experiment 1 Results
Manipulation check. There was a statistically significant mean difference in the
uncertainty salience manipulation check item self-report ratings (see Appendix) between
the three randomly assigned, experimentally manipulated independent variable
conditions, (F(2, 190) = 40.914, p < .001, η2 = .301). Post-hoc comparisons using
Tukey’s HSD indicated that the mean rating (with higher numbers indicating higher
levels of uncertainty) in the uncertainty condition (M = 5.773, SD = 1.796) was
significantly greater than the mean rating for both the mortality salience condition (M =
4.419, SD = 2.177; p < .001), and the control topic salience condition (M = 2.692, SD =
1.879; p < .001). The mortality salience condition was significantly greater than the
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control topic salience condition on uncertainty salience manipulation check ratings (p <
.001). Thus, the uncertainty prime produced more uncertainty salience than the control
and mortality salience conditions. The mortality salience condition produced greater
uncertainty compared to the control condition, but not as much as in the uncertainty
condition. For differences between groups, see the items “Uncertainty salience check,”
“Control topic salience check,” and “Mortality salience check” in Tables 2 and 3.
There emerged a statistically significant mean difference in the control topic
salience check ratings between the three manipulated independent variable conditions, F
(2,190) = 100.417, p < .001, η2 = .514). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test
indicated that the mean rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 2.015, SD = 1.650) was
significantly less than the mean rating for the control topic salience condition (M = 6.031,
SD = 1.667; p < .001). The mortality salience condition mean rating (M = 2.194, SD =
2.126) was also significantly less than the control topic condition on control topic
salience/manipulation check ratings (p < .001). Thus, the control topic (television) prime
produced more salience for that particular topic, but not the others.

Table 2. ANOVA of Manipulation Check and Thoughts/Feelings Variables by Condition, Study 1
Uncertainty
M
SD

Between groups effect
Uncertainty salience
check
Control topic salience
check
Mortality salience
check
Death thoughts
Anxious thoughts
Insecure thoughts
Threat thoughts
Positive affectivity
Negative affectivity

Mortality salience
M
SD

Control
M
SD

F

5.773***

1.796

4.419***

2.177

2.692***

1.879

40.914

2.015***

1.650

2.194***

2.126

6.031***

1.667

100.417

2.530***

2.017

6.177***

1.454

1.785***

1.452

125.351

2.546***

1.874

5.597***

1.531

1.769***

1.389

99.201

4.652***

1.925

4.516***

1.880

2.415***

1.731

29.849

4.500***

1.947

4.065***

1.863

2.169***

1.606

30.445

3.364***
18.379
8.136

2.102
4.154
4.217

3.581***
17.677
7.855

1.887
4.958
4.718

1.831***
17.046
6.877

1.409
4.862
3.243

17.626
1.338
1.697

p
<
.001
<
.001
<
.001
<
.001
<
.001
<
.001
<
.001
.265
.186

η2

Tukey’s HSD

.301

2, 3 < 1; 3 < 2

.514

1, 2 < 3

.569

1 < 2; 1, 2 > 3

.511

1 < 2; 1, 2 > 3

.239

1, 2 > 3

.243

1, 2 > 3

.156
.014
.018

1, 2 > 3
—
—

Note. ηp2 = partial eta squared.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+
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Table 3. Post Hoc Comparisons From Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference Test,
Study 1
Dependent variable/
condition (I)

Condition (J)

SE

p

Uncertainty salience check
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

1.353***
3.080***
-1.727***

0.345
0.341
0.347

< .001
< .001
< .001

Control topic salience check
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.178
-4.016***
3.837***

0.322
0.318
0.323

.845
< .001
< .001

Mortality salience check
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-3.647***
0.746*
-4.393***

0.295
0.291
0.296

< .001
.030
< .001

Death thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-3.051***
0.776
-3.828***

0.285
0.282
0.286

< .001
.018
< .001

Anxious thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

0.135
2.236***
-2.101***

0.327
0.323
0.328

.910
< .001
< .001

Insecure thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

0.435
2.331***
-1.895***

0.320
0.317
0.322

.364
< .001
< .001

Threat thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.217
1.533***
-1.750***

0.322
0.319
0.324

.779
< .001
< .001

Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

0.701
1.333
-0.631

0.825
0.815
0.828

.672
.234
.727

Negative affectivity
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

0.282
1.259
-0.978

0.724
0.716
0.727

.920
.186
.372

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Mean
difference
(I-J)
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There was a statistically significant mean difference in the mortality salience
check ratings among the three manipulation conditions (F(2, 190) = 125.351, p < .001, η2
= .569). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the mean rating for
the uncertainty condition (M = 2.530, SD = 2.017) was significantly less than the mean
rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 6.177, SD = 1.454; p < .001), but
significantly greater than the mean rating for the control topic salience condition (M =
1.785, SD = 1.452; p = .030). The mortality salience condition was significantly greater
than the control topic salience condition in mortality salience manipulation check ratings
(p < .001).
Thus, the life event inventory (LEI) priming method did indeed produce the
greatest levels of uncertainty salience in the uncertainty condition, and the greatest levels
of mortality salience in the mortality salience condition. Notably, however, the mortality
salience prime bolstered uncertainty salience ratings compared to control, and the
uncertainty salience prime bolstered mortality salience ratings compared to control
(though in each case, the non-matching rating was significantly lower than the matching
condition in which it was intended to occur). Thus, this priming method partially
confounds “uncertainty” with “mortality salience.” Priming uncertainty appears to cause
some incidental mortality salience, and priming mortality salience appears to cause some
incidental uncertainty salience.
Preliminary analyses. Preliminary analyses (in preparation for the regression
analyses which directly test the experimental hypotheses discussed) were performed
examining the relation between condition and the moderator variables. Thirteen one-way
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analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants
in the three experimentally manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores
along these variables (see Table 4). As predicted, none of these thirteen variables differed
by condition. ANOVAs were also performed to determine whether or not participants in
the three manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores on the positive
affect and negative affect subscales of the PANAS (see Table 3). As expected, no group
differences were found on the PANAS scales.
Thought and Feeling Measures. Preliminary analyses were also performed
examining the relation between condition and the “Thoughts and Feeling Measures”
(Appendix). Note that these four items were administered after the three manipulation
check items, and they are separate questions from the manipulation check items. The
previous three manipulation check items were purely “thought content” items, while
these four items are combined “thoughts/feelings” items which read as follows: “I
thought about or felt death and dying.” “I thought about or felt anxious.” “I thought about
or felt insecure.” and “I thought about or felt threatened.” Note that the item “I thought
about or felt death and dying” is different and separate from the mortality salience
manipulation check.

Table 4. ANOVA of Moderator Variables by Condition, Study 1
Uncertainty
Between Groups Effect
Intolerance of uncertainty
Intolerance of ambiguity
System justification
(American)
Social dominance
orientation
Belief in a Just World
Trust in Government
Political self-efficacy
Political interest
Political attention
Political knowledge
Voting behavior
Political ideology
Partisanship

Mortality Salience

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Tukey’s
HSD

36.364
-3.409

9.218
7.296

36.081
-3.113

9.081
8.658

34.985
-2.092

8.612
5.923

0.429
0.574

.652
.564

.004
.006

—
—

14.788

4.951

15.016

5.029

13.569

4.448

1.680

.189

.017

—

-21.569 19.002
21.277+ 6.209
4.723
1.409
4.262
1.661
5.508
1.416
5.646
1.363
5.246
1.311
0.985
0.780
-0.043
0.523
-0.049
0.497

0.154
2.617
0.062
0.703
0.189
0.316
0.740
1.288
1.047
1.179

.857
.076
.940
.496
.828
.730
.478
.278
.353
.310

.002
.027
.001
.007
.002
.003
.008
.013
.012
.014

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

-19.697 18.395
23.076+ 6.257
4.667
1.269
4.424
1.479
5.561
1.314
5.849
1.395
5.485
1.350
1.197
0.728
0.075
0.470
0.081
0.493

-21.129 22.919
23.694+ 6.166
4.758
1.743
4.597
1.634
5.661
1.546
5.774
1.654
5.532
1.617
1.065
0.787
-0.034
0.505
-0.033
0.510

Note. ηp2 = partial eta squared.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+
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There was a statistically significant mean difference in the death thoughts/feelings
ratings between the three manipulated conditions (F(2, 190) = 99.201, p < .001, η2 =
.511) See items “Death thoughts” “Anxious thoughts,” “Insecure thoughts” and “Threat
thoughts” in Table 2. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the
death thought/feelings ratings for the uncertainty condition (M = 2.546, SD = 1.874) was
significantly less than the mean rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 5.597, SD
= 1.531; p < .001), but significantly greater than the rating for the control topic salience
condition (M = 1.769, SD = 1.389; p = .018). The mortality salience condition was
significantly greater than the control topic salience condition on the variable of death
thoughts (p < .001). Thus, similar to the mortality salience manipulation check item, this
“death thoughts/feelings” item (a separate item), showcased highest levels in the
mortality salience condition, but also was bolstered (compared to control) in the
uncertainty condition. See items “Death thoughts” “Anxious thoughts,” “Insecure
thoughts” and “Threat thoughts” in Table 3.
There was a statistically significant mean difference in the anxious
thoughts/feelings ratings between the three manipulated/randomly assigned independent
variable conditions (F (2, 190) = 29.849, p < .001, η2 = .239). Post-hoc comparisons
using Tukey’s HSD indicated that the mean anxious rating for the uncertainty condition
(M = 4.652, SD = 1.925) was significantly greater than the mean rating for the control
topic condition (M = 2.415, SD = 1.731; p < .001). The mortality salience condition (M =
4.516, SD = 1.880) was also significantly greater than the control topic condition (p <
.001) on this item. The uncertainty and mortality salience conditions did not differ on this
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item (p > .05). Thus, both uncertainty and mortality salience produced roughly equivalent
levels of heightened self-reported anxiousness, compared to the control condition.
There was a statistically significant mean difference for the insecure
thoughts/feelings ratings among the three manipulated conditions (F(2, 190) = .445, p <
.001, η2 = .243). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the mean
insecure rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 4.500, SD = 1.947) was significantly
greater than the mean rating for the control topic condition (M = 2.169, SD = 1.606; p <
.001). The mortality salience condition (M = 4.065, SD = 1.863) was also significantly
greater than the control topic condition (p < .001). The uncertainty and mortality salience
conditions did not differ on this item (p > .05). Thus, both uncertainty and mortality
salience produced roughly equivalent heightened levels of insecurity compared to
control.
There was a statistically significant mean difference for the threat
thoughts/feelings ratings among the three manipulated conditions (F(2, 190) = 17.626, p
< .001, η2 = .156). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the mean
rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 3.364, SD = 2.102) was significantly greater
than the mean rating for the control topic condition (M = 1.831, SD = 1.409; p < .001).
The mortality salience condition (M = 3.581, SD = 1.887) was also significantly greater
than the control topic condition (p < .001). The uncertainty and mortality salience
conditions did not differ on this item (p > .05). Thus, both uncertainty and mortality
salience produced a comparably heightened sense of threat compared to control.
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In summary, these tests summarized under the “Thoughts and Feeling Measures”
heading exhibit the difference in ratings on the four “thoughts/feelings” items among the
three manipulated conditions. Across all four items, the uncertainty and mortality
salience conditions produced heightened thoughts and feelings ratings compared to the
control condition. Also, across all four items, the uncertainty and mortality salience
conditions did not produce significantly different ratings from one another.
Main analyses. Analyses were performed to examine the relation between
condition and each of the three dependent variables: status quo preference scale, attitudes
towards reformers, and support for regime change. Three one-way analyses of variance
(ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants in the three
manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores on these three dependent
variables respectively (see Table 5).
Results demonstrated that there were no between groups differences on these
dependent variables. Additionally, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of condition
predicting each of the respective dependent variables with the four thoughts/feelings
measures entered as covariates was performed. In each case, the pattern of means did not
differ from the equivalent model ANOVA sans covariates, all (p > .2). Thus, Hypothesis
1 (H1) without interactions was not supported. In addition to these ANOVA and
ANCOVA models, main effects of condition are tested as factors within each of the yet to
be discussed regression model results, in both additive (step1) and interactive (step2)
models. As the regression results shall demonstrate, no main effects of condition emerged
as significant in any of the regression models, either with or without controls, all (p > .2).

Table 5. ANOVA of Three Dependent Variables by Condition, Study 1
Uncertainty

Mortality salience

Control

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Tukey’s
HSD

7.748

39.371

9.038

37.523

8.437

0.766

.466

.008

—

12.410

5.749

12.629

5.692

12.369

5.369

0.039

.961

< .001

—

8.273

2.704

8.419

3.443

9.123

3.059

1.420

.244

.015

—

Between groups effect

M

Status quo preference

38.439

Attitudes towards reformers
Support for regime change

SD

Note. η2 = eta squared.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+
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In these experiments, the status quo preference and support for regime change
scales were coded such that higher values delineated more status quo preference and
more support respectively. The attitudes towards reformers scale was coded such that
higher values delineated more negative attitudes. Because the main effect was nonsignificant, it was not possible to perform analyses that investigate the mediator(s) of this
non-existent effect.
Study 1: Two-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Condition)
Interaction terms were created by multiplying the variables together and entering
the products as predictor variables in a hierarchical linear regression model. Each
moderator was tested separately in two models, where the second model included all four
control variables of (a) death thoughts, (b) anxious thoughts, (c) insecure thoughts, and
(d) threat thoughts. To avoid the gratuitous reporting of nonsignificant results, only
regression models with a significant or marginally significant omnibus result are
decomposed.
Main effects of condition and the moderator were tested at step 1, while condition
by moderator variable (Condition X Moderator) interaction terms were tested at step 2 in
the regression heirarchy. Control variables were entered with the main effects in step 1
for the (“with controls” models). Linear transformations were performed on all
continuous variables before running the regression analyses such that (M = 0, SD = .5).
That is, all continuous variables were re-scaled from -.5 (low on the moderator variables,
one standard deviation below the mean) to .5 (high on the moderator variables, one
standard deviation above the mean.) Stated otherwise, for the regression analyses, scales
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were transformed into a Z-score, and then divided by 2, such that the mean centered on 0
and the standard deviation equaled .5. All subsequent references to “low” and “high”
levels of a continuous variable are coded as above.
Two, two-way interactions were found to be significant at the p < .05 level: (a)
MS X Political Ideology, and (b) US X Attention to Politics. The abbreviations “US” and
“MS” are used here and throughout to refer to the Uncertainty Salience and Mortality
Salience dummy coded variables. In study 1, only the dependent variable of attitudes
towards reformers yielded significant regression results, with the dependent variables of
status quo preference scale and support for regime change failing to yield any significant
results in experiment 1.
Political ideology interaction. For all regression models, dummy coding was
utilized to compare each of the experimental conditions (uncertainty salience, mortality
salience) against the control condition. The uncertainty salience dummy coded variable
(US) was scored as 1 for participants in the uncertainty condition, and 0 for participants
in the other two conditions. The mortality salience dummy coded variable (MS) was
scored as 1 for participants in the mortality salience condition, and 0 for participants in
the other two conditions. The control/referent dummy coded variable was scored with a
value of 0 for both the US and MS conditions.
Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in addition to all main effects (and
controls where applicable) were entered along with the moderator of political ideology
(abbreviated PIDEO) at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 revealed no significant
effect of: US on attitudes toward reformers versus the control dummy code (B = 0.048, β
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= 0.045, SE = 0.087, t(177) = 0.549, p = .583), without controls, (B = 0.062, β = 0.058,
SE = 0.097, t(173) = 0.636, p = .526), with all controls); nor for MS (B = 0.007, β =
0.007, SE = 0.088, t(177) = 0.082, p = .935), without controls (see Table 6); (B = -0.096,
β = -0.089, SE = 0.123, t(173) = -0.783, p = .435), with all controls (see Table 7).
Table 6. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Ideology, Without
Controls, Study 1
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political ideology (PIDEO)
US * PIDEO
MS * PIDEO
Constant
R2(R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

B
SE B
β
.048
.087
.045
.007
.088
.007
-.327*** .072
-.324
—
—
—
—
—
—
-.017
.061
—
.104 (.089)
6.834***

Step 2
B
.042
-.004
-.186
-.138
-.308+
-.011

SE B
β
.087
.039
.088 -.004
.118 -.184
.177 -.075
.173 -.174
.061
—
.120 (.095)
1.598

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of political ideology predicting attitudes
toward reformers in the model without controls (B = -0.327, β = -0.324, SE = 0.072,
t(177) = -4.527, p < .001), such that leftist/liberals exhibited more positive attitudes
towards reformers, and right wing/conservative exhibited more negative attitudes towards
them (an effect well established in prior literature). When controls were entered into the
model, this effect remained significant, B = -0.326 β = -0.322, SE = 0.071, t(173) = 4.591, p < .001, with all controls).
Step 2. Each of the dummy code x moderator interaction terms were entered in
step 2. Regression analyses revealed a marginally significant interaction between MS and
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political ideology predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.308, β =
-0.174, SE = 0.173, t(175) = -1.787, p = .076), which emerged as significant when all
controls were entered into the model (B = -0.360, β = -0.203, SE = 0.169, t(171) = -2.131,
p = .035). The interaction between US and political ideology predicting attitudes towards
reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.138 β = -0.075, SE =
0.177, t(175) = -0.782, p = .436), or with controls (B = -0.156 β = -0.084, SE = 0.175,
t(171) = -0.888, p = .376). See Tables 6 and 7.
Table 7. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Ideology, With
Controls, Study 1
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political ideology (PIDEO)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US * PIDEO
MS * PIDEO
Constant
R2(R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

B

SE B

.062
.097
-.096
.123
-.326*** .071
.147
.120
-.275*
.111
-.006
.127
.272*
.121
—
—
—
—
.014
.071
.172 (.139)
5.150***

Step 2
β

B

.058
-.089
-.322
.145
-.272
-.006
.266
—
—
—

.055
-.134
-.164
.185
-.282*
-.006
.262*
-.156
-.360*
.028

SE B

β

.097
.052
.123 -.124
.114 -.163
.121
.183
.111 -.279
.127 -.006
.121
.255
.175 -.084
.169 -.203
.071
—
.194 (.151)
2.274

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Simple slopes analyses. Without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for
Conservatives, those primed with mortality salience exhibited more negative attitudes
towards reformers, though these effects did not reach the threshold of statistical
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significance (B = 0.150, β = 0.139, SE = 0.119, t(175) = 1.262, p = .209). For Liberals,
those primed with mortality salience exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers,
likewise falling short of statistical significance (B = -0.159, β = -0.147, SE = 0.128, t(175)
= -1.242, p = .216).
With controls in the model, however, significant effects did emerge. For
Conservatives, the mortality salience prime had no effect. (B = 0.046, β = 0.043 SE =
0.139, t(171) = 0.333, p = .739). For Liberals, however, the mortality salience prime
caused an increase in favorable attitudes towards reformers (B = -0.314, β = -0.290, SE =
0.159, t (171) = -1.973, p = .05 exactly). See Figure 1.

Figure 1. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Political Ideology, With Controls. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 1.
Mediated moderation. Analyses of mediated moderation was conducted to
determine if any of the thoughts/feelings measures mediate the significant two-way
interaction reported here. These supplementary mediated moderation analyses are
exploratory and not tied to any particular theory or a-priori hypotheses core to the
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theoretical claims made herein. In other words, failure to find support for mediated
moderation does not impede or affect any evaluations of the previously stated
hypotheses. As will be demonstrated throughout, analyses demonstrate a complete lack of
support for any mediated moderation models. Since the thoughts/feelings measures
cannot simultaneously be treated as control and mediator in the same model, the analyses
for mediated moderation is done without controls. While criteria for assessing mediated
moderation are nuanced and varied, the following basic criteria must be met in order to
suggest mediated moderation via multiple regression. To begin, the analysis can only be
performed if the potential mediator is correlated with the dependent variable of interest,
(Bucy & Tao, 2007; Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt, 2005, Hayes (2009), Edwards & Lambert
(2007). Out of the four thoughts/feelings measures, only “threat” thoughts correlated with
attitudes towards reformers r (193) = .184, p = .01. Therefore, threat will be tested as a
mediator. The other three potential mediators are not correlated with the dependent
variable in the following regression models, anxious: r (193) = -.03, p = .68; death: r
(193) = .111, p = .13; insecure: r (193) = .070, p = .33) and thus do not meet this
criterion. Adapting the methods of Muller et al. (2005) and Bucy & Tao (2007) to the
extant data, it can be said that the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation cannot be
achieved unless the following three p values from the equations below are statistically
significant.
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .076

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .957

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .007

(3)
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Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
political ideology, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB interaction (and
not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p
values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
MSxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(175) =
0.05, pMSXB = .957, and therefore the “initial criteria”(referring to the 3 significance
values) for mediated moderation are not met in this case.
While the above is sufficient to deny mediated moderation, I will continue with
subsequent mediated moderation procedures for the purposes of illustration. Consider the
case that the “initial criteria” are met with all three p values achieving statistical
significance, we would move onto the “secondary criteria” for mediated moderation,
which states that the significant (or marginally significant) coefficient of βMSxB from
equation 1 must be reduced in magnitude when the additional factors of equation 3, (βM
+ βMB) are introduced into the model. That is to say βMSxB35 in equation 3 should be
reduced in magnitude from βMSxB15 in equation 1. For this MS x Political Ideology
interaction, the relevant coefficient actually increased (rather than reduced) in magnitude,
with βMSxB15 = -0.308, and βMSxB35 = -0.484. Thus, we preclude the possibility of
mediated moderation here.
Attention to politics interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes,
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the
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moderator of political attention/attention to politics (abbreviated ATTN) at step 1. Linear
regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of: US on attitudes toward
reformers (B = -0.002, β = -0.002, SE = 0.088, t(189) = -0.022, p = .983), without
controls, (B = 0.003, β = 0.003, SE = 0.098, t(185) = 0.033, p = .974), with all controls),
nor for MS (B = 0.020, β = 0.019, SE = 0.089, t(189) = 0.222, p = .824), without controls
(see Table 8); (B = -0.058, β = -0.054, SE = 0.123, t(185) = -0.467, p = .641),with all
controls (see Table 9).
Table 8. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Attention to Politics, Without Controls,
Study 1
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political attention (ATTN)
US * ATTN
MS * ATTN
Constant
R2(R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

B
-.002
.020
.079
—
—
-.006

SE B

Step 2
β

.088
-.002
.089
.019
.073
.079
—
—
—
—
.062
—
.007 (-.009)
.425

B

SE B

β

-.002
.026
-.090
.373*
.135
-.012

.088
.089
.134
.187
.176
.062
.028 (.002)
2.057

-.002
.025
-.090+
.206
.086
—

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 1 did not reveal a significant main effect of political attention predicting
attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.079, β = 0.079, SE =
0.073, t(189) = 1.094, p = .276), or in the model with controls (B = 0.059 β = 0.059, SE =
0.071, t(185) = 0.828 p = .408, with all controls).
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Table 9. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Attention to Politics, With Controls, Study 1
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political attention (ATTN)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US * ATTN
MS * ATTN
Constant
R2(R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

B

SE B

Step 2
β

.003
.098
.003
-.058
.123
-.054
.059
.071
.059
.083
.118
.083
-.276*
.114
-.276
.003
.131
.003
.328** .120
.328
—
—
—
—
—
—
.017
.072
—
.082 (.047)
2.347*

B

SE B

-.009
.098
-.066
.123
-.130
.132
.094
.119
-.274*
.113
.043
.135
.298*
.127
+
.339
.187
.208
.175
.020
.072
.098 (.054)
1.681

β
-.008
-.062
-.130
.094
-.274
.043
.298
.188
.132
—

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 2. Each of the dummy code x moderator interaction terms were entered in
step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and political
attention predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = 0.373, β = 0.206,
SE = 0.187, t(187) = 1.991, p = .048), which became marginally significant when all
controls were entered into the model(B = 0.339, β = 0.188, SE = 0.187, t(183) = 1.808, p
= .072). The interaction between MS and political attention predicting attitudes towards
reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = 0.135, β = 0.086, SE =
0.176, t(187) = 0.768, p = .444), or with controls (B = 0.208, β = 0.132, SE = 0.175,
t(183) = 1.190, p = .236). See Tables 8 and 9.
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the significant US x political attention
interaction, the simple slopes for this interaction failed to reach statistical significance
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either with or without controls, for both those high and low in political attention. High
political attention without controls; (B = 0.184, β = 0.175, SE = 0.129, t(187) = 1.433, p =
.154), and with controls (B = 0.161, β = 0.153, SE = 0.131, t(183) = 1.230, p = .220).
Low political attention without controls: (B = -0.188, β = -0.179, SE = 0.128, t(187) = 1.476, p = .142), and with controls (B = -0.178, β = -0.169 SE = 0.141, t(183) = -1.265, p
= .207). See Figure 2. When exposed to uncertainty, those high in political attention
exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those low in political attention
exhibiting more positive attitudes, though, as reported above, these simple slopes did not
reach statistical significance.

Figure 2. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Attention to Politics, With Controls. Error
bars represent ±1 standard deviation from the mean, Study 1.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are identical to that described previously. The “initial criteria” for mediated
moderation cannot be achieved unless the following three p values from the equations
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below are statistically significant. Accordingly, the significance of the three pertinent
equations was as follows:
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .048*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .963

(2)

Y = Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .063

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
political attention, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and
not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(187) =
0.05, pβ USXB = .963, and therefore mediated moderation is disqualified.
Study 1: Analysis Summary
The Manipulation Check and Thoughts/Feelings measures demonstrate that the
primes were effective in eliciting the desired affective response in each condition.
However, the expected main effects of the prime did not emerge. Two regression models
did emerge significant, however. The first, MS X Political Ideology interaction, is
theoretically consistent with a-priori hypothesis H2(y) as originally formulated, except
that the effect occurred in the mortality salience condition, as opposed the uncertainty
salience condition. When primed with mortality salience, conservatives’ dislike of
reformers became relatively more polarized in the direction of disliking, and liberals’
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preference for reformers became relatively more pronounced. The US x Attention
interaction as described (with those high in attention harboring more negative attitudes
towards reformers under conditions of uncertainty) did not appear to be consistent with
any of the a-priori hypotheses. Regression models were assessed with and without
controls, as reported in the correspondingly labeled tables throughout the analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE
PILOT STUDY
In order to avoid mono-operation bias and other potential problems associated
with staking one’s theoretical claims on a single operationalization of independent
variable, the aim of experiment 2 was to replicate experiment 1 using a different priming
method. A pilot study was conducted in order to determine which new priming method
should be used in experiment 2: a list recall prime or a word search prime. In the pilot
study, the uncertainty priming materials utilizing the following methods of a) list recall
uncertainty b) word search uncertainty c) life event inventory uncertainty [LEI, used in
study 1], and d) LEI control [also used in study 1] were evaluated with respect to the
three manipulation check item ratings (Appendix). Whichever new prime demonstrated
itself to be most efficacious in bolstering uncertain thoughts would be selected as the
priming method to be implemented in experiment 2. That is to say, participants in the
uncertainty condition of the selected “most efficacious” priming implementation should
feel more uncertainty salience compared to mortality salience and control topic salience;
as well as more uncertainty salience compared to the other priming implementations of
uncertainty tested. The list recall method consisted of asking participants to memorize
and then recall a list containing five words with connotations to uncertainty: uncertain,
shaky, gamble, dicey, and wavering. The word search method
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consisted of asking the participant to locate these same words hidden in a word search
puzzle.
Pilot Test Results
82 American individuals participated in the study arranged through Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Three one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to
determine whether or not participants in the four conditions differed significantly in their
scores on the three dependent variables (see Table 10). Significant findings emerged only
for the dependent variable of uncertainty salience F(3, 78) = 14.173, p < .001, η2 = .353,
to be followed up with pairwise comparisons. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD
indicated that the mean of the word search uncertainty condition (M = 5.273, SD = 1.549,
was significantly greater than the mean for the control condition ((M = 2.952, SD =
2.334, p < .001). The mean rating of the LEI uncertainty condition (M = 6.400, SD =
0.940) was also significantly greater than the mean for the control condition (M = 2.952,
SD = 2.334, p < .001). The mean rating of the LEI uncertainty condition was significantly
greater than the mean for the word search uncertainty condition (p < .001). No other
statistically significant group differences were found (see Table 11).
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Table 10. ANOVA of Manipulation Check by Condition, Pilot Study

Dependent
variable

List recall

Word search

Life event
inventory

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Tukey’s HSD

Uncertainty
salience check

4.211***

1.960

5.273***

1.549

2.952***

2.334

6.400***

0.940

14.173

< .001

.353

1, 3 < 4; 3 < 2

Control topic
salience check

3.316

2.540

2.046

1.812

2.191

2.040

2.400

2.137

1.413

.245

.052

—

Mortality
salience check

2.158

1.864

1.955

1.430

1.238

0.889

2.350

1.872

2.016

.119

.072

—

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+
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Table 11. Post Hoc Comparisons from Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference Test,
Pilot Study

Dependent variable / condition (I)
Uncertainty
List recall
List recall
List recall
Word search
Word search
Word search
Control
Control
Control
Life event inventory
Life event inventory
Life event inventory

Condition (J)

Mean
difference
(I-J)

Word search
Control
Life event inventory
List recall
Control
Life event inventory
List recall
Word search
Life event inventory
List recall
Word search
Control

-1.062
1.258
-2.189**
1.062
2.320***
-1.127
-1.258
-2.320***
-3.448***
2.189**
1.127
3.448***

0.555
0.561
0.568
0.555
0.541
0.548
0.561
0.541
0.554
0.568
0.548
0.554

.231
.121
.001
.231
< .001
.176
.121
< .001
< .001
.001
.176
< .001

Control topic salience check
List recall
List recall
List recall
Word search
Word search
Word search
Control
Control
Control
Life event inventory
Life event inventory
Life event inventory

Word search
Control
Life event inventory
List recall
Control
Life event inventory
List recall
Word search
Life event inventory
List recall
Word search
Control

1.270
1.125
0.916
-1.270
-0.145
-0.355
-1.125
0.145
-0.210
-0.916
0.355
0.210

0.668
0.676
0.684
0.668
0.651
0.659
0.676
0.651
0.667
0.684
0.659
0.667

.236
.349
.541
.236
.996
.950
.349
.996
.989
.541
.950
.989

Mortality salience check
List recall
List recall
List recall
Word search
Word search
Word search

Word search
Control
Life event inventory
List recall
Control
Life event inventory

0.203
0.920
-0.192
-0.203
0.716
-0.395

0.486
0.491
0.497
0.486
0.473
0.479

.975
.249
.980
.975
.435
.843

Mortality salience check (cont’d)
Control
Control
Control
Life event inventory
Life event inventory
Life event inventory

List recall
Word search
Life event inventory
List recall
Word search
Control

-0.920
-0.716
-1.112
0.192
0.395
1.112

0.491
0.473
0.485
0.497
0.479
0.485

.249
.435
.108
.980
.843
.108

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

SE

p
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Pilot Test Discussion
These results suggest that both the LEI and Word Search manipulations produced
greater uncertainty than the control condition, although this effect was more strongly
pronounced for the LEI (already deployed in experiment 1). Thus, the comparison among
priming methods demonstrates that against the control condition, the LEI and the word
search conditions both primed uncertainty thoughts to a greater degree compared to
control, while the list priming method did not. The word search prime was not quite as
effective as the LEI in eliciting uncertainty salience. In other words, the word search
prime elicited more uncertainty salience than the control condition, but not more than the
LEI condition. Since the LEI was already deployed in experiment 1, this left only the
word search prime as a viable option for experiment 2. In the pilot, none of the various
uncertainty primes exhibited any effect on participants’ mortality salience or control topic
salience ratings (see Table 11).

CHAPTER SIX
EXPERIMENT 2
Between experiment 1 and experiment 2, theoretical rationale and hypotheses are
exactly identical. Save for the change from LEI to Word Search, the methods, procedure,
and analysis protocol run on study 2 are the same as that of study 1. In experiment 2,
there was a different puzzle for each of the three conditions. In each condition,
participants were asked to look at the word search puzzle in which five words were
hidden. In the uncertainty salience condition, words in the first puzzle include: uncertain,
shaky, gamble, dicey, and wavering. In the mortality salience condition, words will
include: death, mortal, grave, tombs, demise. In the control condition, words in the first
puzzle include: television, dust, goggles, afternoon, spot (see Appendix). After being
randomly assigned to one of the puzzle three conditions, participants were challenged to
find all the words in the puzzle in under two minutes, at which point a timer expired and
participants were asked to go on to the subsequent questionnaire.
With this new manipulation method (word search prime), some potential validity
threats idiosyncratic to the thought generation LEI uncertainty-prime can be said to be
guarded against. In experiment 1, it was found that recalling moments where one feels
uncertain tangentially activates mortality salience to some extent. The problem
potentially exists because participants in the uncertainty condition might generate
memories pertaining to death, and therefore, the uncertainty and mortality salience
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conditions become blurred in this manner. The priming method in experiment 2 addresses
this issue further by removing the idea of generated memories and their associated
confounds which may be present with the life event inventory (LEI) methodology. The
psychological effects of recalling autobiographical memories meant to elicit particular
emotions (experiment 1) may differ from implicit concept activation via a word search
prime (experiment 2). This may occur as a result of a self-referencing effect inherent in
the generation of autobiographical information, or any number of other consequences of
that particular manipulation which may subtly influence the relation between the
independent variable construct (uncertainty) and our inevitably imperfect
operationalization of it. Hence, replication of design with the word search manipulation
offers some protection against the dangers of mono-operation bias. 197 American
individuals participated in the study arranged through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Manipulation Check
There was a statistically significant mean difference in the mortality salience
manipulation check item self-report ratings between the three randomly assigned,
experimentally manipulated independent variable conditions F(2, 194) = 9.196, p < .001,
η2 = .087. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean
manipulation check rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 2.861, SD = 1.878)
was significantly greater than that of the uncertainty condition (M = 1.776, SD = 1.346; p
< .001). The mortality salience condition was also significantly greater than the control
topic salience condition (M = 1.877, SD = 1.536; p = .002).
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Notably, there were no differences among conditions on the other two
manipulation check items (uncertainty salience, and control topic salience). For
differences between groups, see the items “Uncertainty salience check,” “Control topic
salience check,” and “Mortality salience check” in Tables 12 and 13. Unlike in the pilot
study, the uncertainty puzzle prime failed to produce heightened levels of self-reported
thoughts about uncertainty compared to control.
Contrasting the manipulation check item analyses of experiment 1 with
experiment 2, there are some key differences to note. In experiment 1, both LEI primed
uncertainty and LEI primed mortality salience produced greater levels of their respective
manipulation check item rating; with respect to the control condition as well as each
other. LEI primed uncertainty also caused an increase in mortality salience manipulation
check ratings, but not as high as in the mortality salience condition. LEI primed mortality
salience also caused an increase in uncertainty salience manipulation check ratings, but
not as high as in the uncertainty salience condition.

Table 12. ANOVA of Manipulation Check and Thoughts/Feelings Variables by Condition, Study 2
Uncertainty
Between groups effect
Uncertainty salience check
Control topic salience check
Mortality salience check
Death thoughts
Anxious thoughts
Insecure thoughts
Threat thoughts
Positive affectivity
Negative affectivity

Mortality Salience

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Tukey’s
HSD

3.508
2.015
1.776***
1.716**
2.687
2.299
1.881+
18.642
8.164

1.972
1.728
1.346
1.216
1.500
1.467
1.503
4.773
4.433

3.308
2.446
2.862***
2.692**
3.046
2.800
2.508+
19.200
9.062

2.015
2.031
1.878
1.758
1.849
1.752
1.778
4.262
4.815

3.262
2.631
1.877***
1.939**
2.754
2.262
2.062+
19.185
7.846

1.881
2.176
1.536
1.638
1.803
1.670
1.694
4.531
4.210

0.296
1.679
9.196
7.128
0.808
2.216
2.481
0.327
1.281

.744
.189
< .001
.001
.447
.112
.086
.722
.280

.003
.017
.087
.068
.008
.022
.025
.003
.013

—
—
1, 3 < 2
1, 3 < 2
—
—
—
—
—

Note. ηp2 = partial eta squared.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+
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Table 13. Post Hoc Comparisons from Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference Test,
Study 2

Dependent variable / condition (I)
Uncertainty salience check
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

0.200
0.246
-0.046

0.341
0.341
0.343

.828
.751
.990

Control topic salience check
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.431
-0.616
0.185

0.346
0.346
0.348

.426
.178
.857

Mortality salience check
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-1.085***
-0.101
-0.985**

0.278
0.278
0.281

< .001
.930
.002

Death thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.976**
-0.222
-0.754*

0.270
0.270
0.272

.001
.690
.017

Anxious thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.360
-0.067
-0.292

0.300
0.300
0.302

.455
.973
.598

Insecure thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.501
0.037
-0.538

0.284
0.284
0.286

.184
.991
.147

Threat thoughts
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.627+
-0.181
-0.446

0.289
0.289
0.291

.079
.806
.278

Positive affectivity
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.558
-0.543
-0.015

0.789
0.789
0.794

.759
.771
1.000

Negative affectivity
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Control

Mortality salience
Control
Mortality

-0.897
0.318
-1.215

0.782
0.782
0.788

.486
.913
.274

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Condition (J)

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

SE

p
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In experiment 2, word search primed mortality salience produced the greatest
levels of mortality salience manipulation check item ratings compared to each of the
other two conditions. Notably, however, it did not produce greater levels of uncertainty
salience as well (as it did in experiment 1 with LEI). Similarly, the word search primed
uncertainty did not produce heightened levels of mortality salience. This could be seen as
positive, as the potential confound of experiment 1(uncertainty condition priming
incidental mortality salience, and mortality condition priming incidental uncertainty
salience) appears not to be an issue in experiment 2. Surprisingly however, the
experiment 2 word search uncertainty priming condition failed to produce heightened
levels of self- report uncertainty salience, as assessed via ratings on the uncertainty
salience manipulation check item.
Given that the pilot test and experiment 2 deployed the same manipulation of
word-search uncertainty, we naturally expected manipulation check results from the pilot
to replicate in experiment 2, but they did not. It is possible that this is because in
experiments 1 and 2, the PANAS and dependent variable measures were administered
subsequent to the prime and before assessing these three manipulation check items. In the
pilot, participants were exposed to the manipulation, given the three manipulation check
items, and then dismissed (No PANAS). Thus, in experiment 2, more time and
conceptual interference may have occurred between priming and the assessment of the
manipulation checks, eliminating the effects showcased in the pilot test for the
uncertainty crossword prime.
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It could be the case that the prime failed to activate the relevant cognitiveemotional constructs in experiment 2 necessary for producing effects on the dependent
variable(s); Alternatively, it could be the case that participants exposed to the word
search were less self-aware of the effects of the prime upon their cognitions and
emotions, yet the prime still exerted its effects below the level of awareness necessary to
manifest via the manipulation check self-report items. As will soon be discussed, the
latter case seems likely, as various US X Moderator interactions did indeed produce a
variety of significant results in experiment 2 regression models despite lackluster results
on the uncertainty salience manipulation check. In the studies of Schwarz & Clore
(1983), participants expressed a more positive mood on sunny days, but the effect was
eliminated when the possible influence of the weather upon their mood was made salient
by the researcher. In a similar vein, the PANAS introduced between the prime and the
manipulation check item in study 2 (and not the pilot) may have obscured participant
awareness with respect to the effects of the prime on the participants’ mental state,
allowing the prime to exhibit effects on the dependent variables, yet show no differences
on the manipulation check items (Lombardi et al. 1987; Strack et al., 1993). Such
research suggests that the most direct or blatant primes are often consciously discounted,
while subtler primes may exert their influence undetected. “Filler tasks” are often
deployed in such a manner within survey research so that participants’ awareness is
directed away from the effects of the prime (See, Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, Loresch et al.
2011) for a discussion of this and similar effects in priming and automaticity research.
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Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses (in preparation for the regression analyses which directly
tests the experimental hypotheses discussed) were performed examining the relation
between condition and the moderator variables. Thirteen one-way analyses of variance
(ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants in the three
manipulated conditions differed significantly on these variable ratings (see Table 4).
Significant group differences were found for one out of the thirteen variables: trust in
government, F(2, 194) = 3.511, p = .032, η2 = .035. Post-hoc comparisons using the
Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the uncertainty condition (M = 4.552,
SD = 1.449) was significantly less than the mean score for the control topic condition (M
= 5.200, SD = 1.449; p = .027). Thus, random assignment to condition was not achieved
on this singular moderating variable. As with experiment 1, we hoped that these 13
individual difference variables would be randomly distributed across randomly assigned
experimentally manipulated conditions. There are two ways to interpret such an outcome,
however; one interpretation being that random assignment failed, the other being that the
uncertainty prime caused decreased trust in government in experiment 2 (i.e. trust in
government acted as a dependent variable, rather than a more stable individual difference
moderator as expected). Therefore, two significant regressions (yet to be presented)
which arose in experiment 2 involving trust in government as the moderator should be
viewed with a high degree of caution, as a key assumption of interactive regression
models (moderator should be independent of the remaining independent variable(s)) has
been violated in this case. ANOVAs were also performed to determine whether or not
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participants in the three manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores on
the positive affect and negative affect subscales of the PANAS; they did not (see Table
14).
Thought and Feeling Measures
Identical to experiment 1, these consisted of the four questions, after the
manipulation check, asking participants: “I thought about or felt death and dying.” “I
thought about or felt anxious.” “I thought about or felt insecure.” “thought about or felt
threatened.” Out of these four thoughts/feeling ratings, only ratings on the item “I thought
about or felt death and dying” differed by condition, with the other three items showing
no differences by condition.
There was a statistically significant mean difference in the death thoughts/feelings
ratings between the three manipulated conditions, F(2, 194) = 7.128, p = .001, η2 = .068.
See items “Death thoughts” in Table 2. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test
indicated that the mean rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 2.692, SD =
1.758) was significantly greater than the mean rating for the uncertainty condition (M =
1.716, SD = 1.216; p = .001. The mortality salience condition (M = 2.692, SD = 1.758)
was also significantly greater than the control topic condition (M = 1.939, SD = 1.638; p
= .017). There were no significant differences between uncertainty and control conditions
on this item (p = .69). See item “Death thoughts” in Table 3.

Table 14. ANOVA of Moderator Variables by Condition, Study 2
Uncertainty
Between Groups Effect
Intolerance of uncertainty
Intolerance of ambiguity
System justification (American)
Social dominance orientation
Belief in a just world
Trust in government
Political self-efficacy
Political interest
Political attention
Political knowledge
Voting behavior
Political ideology
Partisanship

Mortality salience

Control

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Tukey’s
HSD

34.851
-0.851
14.403
-17.791
22.119+
4.552*
4.343
5.313
5.463
5.328
0.761
-0.056
-0.057

11.162
8.543
5.595
21.891
6.951
1.449
1.572
1.716
1.439
1.284
0.720
0.551
0.487

35.092
-2.446
14.723
-15.446
23.769+
4.985*
4.831
5.631
5.708
5.523
0.892
0.019
-0.058

9.839
7.278
4.939
19.503
6.547
1.397
1.654
1.485
1.400
1.382
0.732
0.487
0.555

34.739
-1.492
16.200
-20.292
24.677+
5.200*
4.631
5.539
5.769
5.631
0.892
0.035
0.099

9.553
7.351
4.822
20.568
6.293
1.449
1.577
1.631
1.412
1.306
0.710
0.464
0.454

0.020
0.706
2.284
0.892
2.548
3.511
1.548
0.677
0.868
0.887
0.732
0.579
1.928

.980
.495
.105
.412
.081
.032
.215
.509
.422
.414
.482
.561
.149

< .001
.007
.023
.009
.026
.035
.016
.007
.009
.009
.007
.006
.023

—
—
—
—
—
1<3
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Note. η2 = eta squared.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+
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Unlike in experiment 1, none of the other “thoughts and feelings” measures
(anxious, insecure, threat) differed by condition in experiment 2, according to the selfreported ratings for these items. As mentioned previously, we speculate either that the
priming method in experiment 2 (word search) was either less effective than the LEI; or
that it is comparably effective but subtler (less “blatant”) and thus less likely to be
recognized and reported via these self-report items, a possibility recognized by
automaticity and priming scholars including, Bargh & Chartrand, (2000); Lombardi et al.
(1987); Loresch et al. (2011).
Main Analyses
As with the procedures reported above for experiment 1, the main analyses for
experiment 2 were performed in an identical fashion. Analyses were performed to
examine the relation between condition and each of the three dependent variables: status
quo preference scale, attitudes towards reformers, and support for regime change. Three
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not
participants in the three experimentally manipulated conditions differed significantly in
their scores on these three dependent variables respectively.
Results demonstrated that there were no between groups differences on these
dependent variables (see Table 15). Additionally, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of
condition predicting each of the respective dependent variables with the four
thoughts/feelings measures entered as covariates was performed. In each case, the pattern
of means did not differ from the equivalent model ANOVA sans covariates, all (p > .2).
As with experiment 1, Hypothesis 1 (H1) without interactions was not supported in

99
experiment 2. In addition to these ANOVA and ANCOVA models, main effects of
condition were tested as factors within each of the yet to be discussed experiment 2
regression model results, in both additive (Step 1) and interactive (Step 2) models. As
with experiment 1, the regression results in experiment 2 shall demonstrate no main
effects of condition in any of the regression models, either with or without controls, all (p
> .2).
Study 2: Two-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Condition)
Interaction terms were created by multiplying the variables together and entering
the products as predictor variables in a hierarchical linear regression model as described
previously. Identical to experiment 1, each moderator was tested separately for each
dependent variable in two models, where the second model included all four control
variables of (a) death thoughts, (b) anxious thoughts, (c) insecure thoughts, and (d) threat
thoughts. All coding procedures are exactly identical to those in experiment 1.
Two-way interactions significant for the dependent variable of status quo
preference scale included: (a) US X Political Ideology, and (b) US X Party Identification.
Several two-way interactions were found to be significant at the p < .05 level for the
dependent variable of attitude towards reformers: (a) MS X Political Ideology, and (b)
MS X Social Dominance Orientation, (c) MS X System Justification, (d) US X
Intolerance of Uncertainty, (e) US X Political Self-Efficacy, and (f) US X Trust in
Government. Two-way interactions significant for the dependent variable of regime
change included: (a) US X Belief in a Just World, and (b) US X Trust in Government.

Table 15. ANOVA of Three Dependent Variables by Condition, Study 2
Uncertainty

Mortality salience

Control
F

p

η2

Tukey’s
HSD

9.791

0.531

.589

.005

—

12.708

5.528

0.722

.487

.007

—

8.985

3.595

0.391

.677

.004

—

Between groups effect

M

SD

M

SD

M

Status quo preference

38.761

9.232

38.246

10.047

37.062

Attitude toward reform

12.015

6.285

13.277

6.279

9.448

3.831

8.923

3.768

Regime change

SD

Note. η2 = eta squared.
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Interactions: Predicting Status Quo Preference
Political ideology. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in addition to all
main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the moderator of
political ideology (abbreviated PIDEO) at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1
revealed no significant effect of US on status quo preference, (B = 0.085, β = 0.081, SE =
0.088, t(180) = 0.967, p = .335), without controls, (B = 0.095, β = 0.091, SE = 0.079,
t(176) = 1.201, p = .231), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.048, β = 0.046, SE =
0.088, t(180) = 0.552, p = .581), without controls; (B = 0.001, β = 0.001, SE = 0.080,
t(176) = 0.012, p = .991), with all controls (see Tables 16 and 17).
Table 16. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Ideology, Without Controls,
Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political ideology
(PIDEO)
US X PIDEO
MS X PIDEO
Constant

B

SE B

β

.085
.048

.088
.088

.081
.046

-.142+
—
—
-.051

.072
—
—
.061

-.145
—
—
—

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.028 (.011)
1.702

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 2
B

SE B

β

.082
.057

.087
.087

.079
.055

.131
.173
.183
.060

.119
-.300
-.137
—

.117
-.469**
-.243
-.060

.066 (.040)
3.675*
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Table 17. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Ideology, With Controls, Study 2

Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political ideology (PIDEO)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X PIDEO
MS X PIDEO
Constant

Step 1
SE
B

B

.095
.001
-.200**
.017
.208*
-.179
.435***
—
—
-.041

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.079
.080
.065
.098
.094
.117
.121
—
—
.055

.247 (.217)
8.254***

Step 2
β

B

SE B

β

.091
.001
-.204
.018
.210
-.180
.445
—
—
—

.091
.013
.021
-.009
.204*
-.196+
.467***
-.435**
-.154
-.050

.077
.079
.117
.096
.093
.115
.120
.155
.163
.054

.087
.012
.021
-.009
.206
-.198
.477
-.278
-.087
—

.282 (.244)
4.166*

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 1 revealed a marginally significant main effect of political ideology
predicting status quo preference in the model without controls (B = -0.142, β = -0.145, SE
= 0.072, t(180) = -1.964, p = .051), such that leftist/liberals actually exhibited slightly
more status quo preference(opposite of the expected pattern, See rightmost column of
Figure 3). When controls were entered into the model, this effect became statistically
significant, (B = -0.200 β = -0.204, SE = 0.065, t(176) = -3.067, p = .003, with all
controls). The control variable of anxious thoughts was statistically significant in the step
1 control model (B = 0.208, β = 0.210, SE = 0.094, t(176) = 2.203, p = .029), such that
increases in anxious thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference. The
control variable of threat thoughts was also statistically significant in the step 1 control
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model (B = 0.435, β = 0.445, SE = 0.121, t(176) = 3.588, p < .001), such that increases in
threat thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference.

Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Status Quo Preference, Moderated by Political Ideology, With Controls. Error bars
represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and
political ideology predicting status quo preference, without controls (B = -0.469, β = 0.300, SE = 0.173, t(178) = -2.707, p = .007), which remained significant when all
controls were entered into the model(B = -0.435, β = -0.278, SE = 0.155, t(174) = -2.809,
p = .006). The interaction between MS and political ideology predicting status quo
preference did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.243, β = -0.137, SE =
0.183, t(178) = -1.327, p = .186), or with controls (B = -0.154, β = -0.087, SE = 0.163,
t(174 ) = -0.944, p = .347). The control variable of threat thoughts was statistically
significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.467, β = 0.477, SE = 0.120, t(174) = 3.895,
p < .001), and so was the control variable of anxious thoughts in the step 2 control model
(B = 0.204, β = 0.206, SE = 0.093, t(174) = 2.195, p = .029. See Table 17.
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Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Political Ideology interaction,
without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for Conservatives, those primed
with uncertainty salience exhibited a greater status quo preference (B = 0.317, β = 0.303,
SE = 0.122, t(178) = 2.595, p = .010). With controls in the model, the remained
statistically significant (B = 0.308 β = 0.295, SE = 0.109, t(174) = 2.825, p = .005).
Statistical significance was not achieved for Liberals primed with uncertainty salience
without controls (B = -0.152, β = -0.146, SE = 0.123, t(178) = -1.234, p = .219), or with
controls (B = -0.126, β = -0.121, SE = 0.110, t(174) = -1.150, p = .252). See Figure 3.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are exactly identical to that described previously, in Bucy & Tao (2007),
Muller et al. (2005), and are only pursued if the same basic criteria are met among
variables. As mentioned previously, throughout the text empirical support for models of
mediated moderation are completely lacking throughout; yet this fact does not affect the
evaluation of any of the formally stated hypotheses. Accordingly, the significance of the
Bucy & Tao (2007), Muller et al. (2005) equations is as follows:
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .007**

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .723

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .0071**

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
political ideology, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of status quo preference. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not
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the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(178) = 0.36, pβ USXB = .723, and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not
met and we cannot proceed further down this line of inquiry. Furthermore, the relevant
coefficient was not reduced from equation 1 to equation 3, disqualifying mediated
moderation.
Party identification. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in addition to
all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the moderator of
party identification (abbreviated PPARTY) at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1
revealed no significant effect of US on status quo preference, (B = 0.064, β = 0.065, SE =
0.083, t(164) = 0.766, p = .445), without controls, (B = 0.078, β = 0.079, SE = 0.078,
t(160) = 0.995, p = .321), with all controls), nor for MS (B = -0.001, β = -0.001, SE =
0.085, t(164) = -0.012, p = .991), without controls; (B = -0.021, β = -0.021, SE = 0.080,
t(160) = -0.257, p = .797), with all controls (see Tables 18 and 19).
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Table 18. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Party Identification, Without Controls,
Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Party identification
(PPARTY)
US X PPARTY
MS X PPARTY
Constant

B

SE B

.064
-.001

.083
.085

-.244**
—
—
-.035

.070
—
—
.057

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

Step 2
β

B

SE B

β

.065
-.001

.068
.018

.083
.085

.070
.018

-.265
—
—
—

-.076
-.378*
-.131
-.052

.125
.175
.168
.057

-.083
-.228
-.087
—

.077 (.060)
4.585**

.104 (.076)
2.403+

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Table 19. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Party Identification, With Controls, Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Party identification (PPARTY)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X PPARTY
MS X PPARTY
Constant

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

.078
-.021
-.155*
-.011
.214*
-.187
.353**
—
—
-.035

.078
.080
.068
.105
.094
.117
.122
—
—
.053

.079
-.021
-.169
-.011
.227
-.196
.382
—
—
—

.082
-.002
-.010
-018
.216*
-.196+
.356**
-.340*
-.109
-.050

.078
.080
.117
.104
.093
.117
.122
.163
.156
.054

.084
-.002
-.011
-.018
.229
-.205
.385
-.206
-.072
—

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 2

.227 (.193)
6.719***

.249 (.206)
2.285
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of party identification predicting status
quo preference in the model without controls (B = -0.244, β = -0.265, SE = 0.070, t(164)
= -3.495, p = .001), such that Democrats exhibited less negative attitudes towards the
status quo, and Republicans exhibited more negative attitudes towards the status quo.
When controls were entered into the model, this effect remained statistically significant,
(B = -0.155 β = -0.169, SE = 0.068, t(160) = -2.275, p = .024, with all controls). The
control variable of anxious thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control
model (B = 0.214, β = 0.227, SE = 0.094, t(160) = 2.285, p = .024), such that increases in
anxious thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference. The control
variable of threat thoughts was also statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B
= 0.353, β = 0.382, SE = 0.122, t(160) = 2.887, p = .004), such that increases in threat
thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and
party identification predicting status quo preference, without controls (B = -0.378, β = 0.228, SE = 0.175, t(162) = -2.152, p = .033), which remained significant when all
controls were entered into the model (B = -0.340, β = -0.206, SE = 0.163, t(158) = -2.086,
p = .039). The interaction between MS and party identification predicting status quo
preference did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.131, β = -0.087, SE =
0.168, t(162) = -0.778, p = .438), or with controls (B = -0.109, β = -0.072, SE = 0.156,
t(158) = -0.694, p = .489). The control variable of threat thoughts remained statistically
significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.356, β = 0.385, SE = 0.122, t(158) = 2.927,
p = .004). Moreover, the control variable of anxious thoughts returned significance in the
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step 2 control model (B = 0.216, β = 0.229, SE = 0.093, t(158) = 2.316, p = .022). See
Tables 18 and 19.
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Party Identification
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for Republicans, those
primed with uncertainty salience exhibited a greater status quo preference (B = 0.257, β =
0.263, SE = 0.124, t(162) = 2.082, p = .039). With controls in the model, the effect
remained statistically significant (B = 0.252 β = 0.257, SE = 0.115, t(158) = 2.186, p =
.030). Statistical significance was not achieved for Democrats primed with uncertainty
salience without controls (B = -0.120, β = -0.123, SE = 0.118, t(162) = -1.019, p = .310),
or with controls (B = -0.088, β = -0.090, SE = 0.110, t(158) = -0.801, p = .424). See
Figure 4.

Figure 4. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Status Quo Preference, Moderated by Party Identification, With Controls. Error bars
represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
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Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here are
identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of the three equations
is as follows:
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .033*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .525

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .045*

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
party identification, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of status quo preference. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not
the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(162) =
0.64, pβ USXB = .525 and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not
met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude,
disqualifying mediated moderation.
Predicting Attitudes Towards Reformers
Political ideology interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in
addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the
moderator of political ideology (abbreviated PIDEO) at step 1. Linear regression results
at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward reformers: B = -0.050, β
= -0.048, SE = 0.087, t(180) = -0.568, p = .571), without controls, (B = -0.039, β = -
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0.038, SE = 0.081, t(176) = -0.482, p = .631), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.018, β
= 0.017, SE = 0.087, t(180) = 0.201, p = .841), without controls; (B = -0.019, β = -0.019,
SE = 0.083, t(176) = -0.234, p = .815),with all controls (see Tables 20 and 21).
Table 20. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitudes Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Ideology, Without
Controls, Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political ideology (PIDEO)
US * PIDEO
MS * PIDEO
Constant
R2(R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

B
-.050
.018
-.177*
—
—
.007

SE B

Step 2
β

.087
-.048
.087
.017
.072
-.180
—
—
—
—
.061
—
.034 (.018)
2.135+

B

SE B

β

-.043
.087 -.041
.028
.087
.027
.033
.131
.034
-.226
.173 -.145
-.395*
.184 -.223
.000
.060
—
.059 (.033)
2.325

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of political ideology predicting attitudes
toward reformers in the model without controls (B = -0.177, β = -0.180, SE = 0.072,
t(180) = -2.455, p = .015), such that leftist/liberals exhibited more positive attitudes
towards reformers, and right wing/conservative exhibited more negative attitudes towards
them(concordant with study 1, as well as previously established literature). When
controls were entered into the model, this effect remained significant, (B = -0.222 β = 0.227, SE = 0.067, t(176) = -3.298, p < .001, with all controls). The control variable of
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.459, β =
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0.471, SE = 0.125, t(176) = 3.668, p < .001), such that increases in threat thoughts were
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.
Table 21. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitudes Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Ideology, With
Controls, Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political ideology (PIDEO)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US * PIDEO
MS * PIDEO
Constant
R2(R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

B

SE B

-.039
.081
-.019
.083
-.222** .067
-.023
.101
.090
.098
-.148
.120
.459*** .125
—
—
—
—
.014
.057
.193 (.161)
6.028***

Step 2
β
-.038
-.019
-.227
-.024
.091
-.150
.471
—
—
—

B

SE B

-.035
.081
-.009
.083
-.037
.123
-.031
.101
.078
.097
-.139
.120
.457*** .125
-.209
.162
-.330+
.171
.007
.056
.211 (.170)
1.906

β
-.033
-.008
-.038
-.031
.079
-.140
.469
-.134
-.186
—

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between MS and
political ideology predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.395, β =
-0.223, SE = 0.184, t(178) = -2.150, p = .033), which became marginally significant when
all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.330, β = -0.186, SE = 0.171, t(174) = 1.928, p = .055). The interaction between US and political ideology predicting attitudes
towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.226 β = 0.145, SE = 0.173, t(178) = -1.301, p = .195), or with controls (B = -0.209 β = -0.134, SE
= 0.162, t(174) = -1.291, p = .198). The control variable of threat thoughts remained
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statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.457, β = 0.469, SE = 0.125,
t(174) = 3.649, p < .001). See Tables 20 and 21.
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the significant MS X Political Ideology
interaction, the simple slopes for this interaction failed to reach statistical significance
either with or without controls for both Liberals and Conservatives. Liberals: without
controls; (B = -0.169, β = -0.162, SE = 0.123, t(178) = -1.378, p = .170), and with
controls (B = -0.173, β = -0.166, SE = 0.115, t(174) = -1.506, p = .134). Conservatives:
without controls; (B = 0.266, β = 0.217, SE = 0.130, t(178) = 1.738, p = .084), and with
controls (B = 0.156, β = 0.150, SE = 0.123, t(174) = 1.273, p = .205). See Figure 5.

Figure 5. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Political Ideology, With Controls. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here are
identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of the three equations
is as follows:
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .033*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .457

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .012*

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
political ideology, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB interaction (and
not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p
values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
MSxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(178) = 0.75, pβ MSXB = .457. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not
met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude,
disqualifying mediated moderation.
Social dominance orientation interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS
dummy codes, in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were
entered along with the moderator of social dominance orientation (abbreviated SDO) at
step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes
toward reformers, (B = -0.096, β = -0.091, SE = 0.067, t(193) = -1.430, p = .154), without
controls, (B = -0.085, β = -0.081, SE = 0.066, t(189) = -1.297, p = .196), with all
controls), nor for MS (B = -0.028, β = -0.026, SE = 0.068, t(193) = -0.410, p = .682),
without controls; (B = -0.020, β = -0.019, SE = 0.068, t(189) = -0.299, p = .765),with all
controls (see Tables 22 and 23).
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Table 22. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Social Dominance Orientation, Without
Controls, Study 2
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Social dominance
orientation (SDO)
US * SDO
MS * SDO
Constant

Step 1
SE B

B

β

B

Step 2
SE B

β

-.096
-.028

.067
.068

-.091
-.026

-.091
-.038

.066
.067

-.087
-.036

.641***
—
—
.042

.055
—
—
.048

.641
—
—
—

.562***
-.046
.327*
.037

.095
.130
.138
.047

.562
-.028
.177
—

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.414 (.405)
45.449***

.440 (.425)
4.407*

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Table 23. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Social Dominance Orientation, With
Controls, Study 2
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Social dominance
orientation (SDO)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US * SDO
MS * SDO
Constant

B

Step 1
SE B

-.085
-.020

.066
.068

.609***
-.093
.228**
-.146
.169
—
—
.036

.059
.082
.081
.100
.108
—
—
.047

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

.456 (.436)
22.630***

B

Step 2
SE B

-.081
-.019

-.081
-.032

.065
.067

-.077
-.030

.609
-.093
.228
-.146
.169
—
—
—

.538***
-.065
.219**
-.145
.143
-.032
.296*
.032

.097
.082
.080
.099
.107
.127
.136
.047

.538
-.065
.219
-.145
.143
-.020
.160
—

β

.476 (.451)
3.535*

β
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of social dominance orientation in the
model without controls (B = 0.641, β = 0.641, SE = 0.055, t(193) = 11.572, p < .001),
such that participants who were high in social dominance orientation exhibited more
negative attitudes towards reformers, and those who were low in social dominance
orientation exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. When controls were
entered into the model, this effect remained significant, (B = 0.609 β = 0.609, SE = 0.059,
t(189) = 10.261, p < .001, with all controls). The control variable of anxious thoughts was
statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.228, β = 0.228, SE = 0.081,
t(189) = 2.803, p = .006), such that increases in anxious thoughts were associated with
more negative attitudes towards reformers.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between MS and
social dominance orientation predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B =
0.327, β = 0.177, SE = 0.138, t(191) = 2.364, p = .019), which remained significant when
all controls were entered into the model(B = 0.296, β = 0.160, SE = 0.136, t(187) = 2.167,
p = .031). The interaction between US and social dominance orientation predicting
attitudes towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.046,
β = -0.028, SE = 0.130, t(191) = -0.357, p = .722), or with controls (B = -0.032, β = 0.020, SE = 0.127, t(187) = -0.255, p = .799). The control variable of anxious thoughts
remained statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.219, β = 0.219, SE =
0.080, t(187) = 2.719, p = .007). See Tables 24 and 25.
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Table 24. Condition Regressed Onto Attitude Towards Reformers for Participants High
and Low on Social Domination Orientation, Without Controls, Study 2
Uncertainty
salience
Participant group

Mortality
salience

Control

M

SE M

M

SE M

M

SE M

High social dominance

.204

.064

.444

.065

.318

.071

Low social dominance

-.312

.064

-.445

.073

-.244

.063

Table 25. Condition Regressed Onto Attitude Towards Reformers for Participants High
and Low on Social Domination Orientation, With Controls, Study 2
Uncertainty
salience
Participant group

Mortality
salience

Control

M

SE M

M

SE M

M

SE M

High social dominance

.204

.063

.417

.066

.301

.071

Low social dominance

-.301

.065

-.416

.074

-.237

.063

Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the significant MS X Social Dominance
Orientation interaction, the simple slopes analyses revealed that for those low in social
dominance orientation, those primed with mortality salience exhibited more positive
attitudes towards reformers without controls (B = -0.201, β = -0.190, SE = 0.097, t(191) =
-2.085, p = .038). With controls in the model, the effect reached marginal significance (B
= -0.179, β = -0.169, SE = 0.096, t(187) = -1.860, p = .065). Statistical significance was
not achieved for participants high in social dominance orientation when primed with
mortality salience without controls (B = 0.126, β = 0.119, SE = 0.096, t(191) = 1.311, p =
.191), or with controls (B = 0.116, β = 0.110, SE = 0.095, t(187) = 1.226, p = .222). When
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primed with mortality salience, participants high in social dominance orientation
showcased more negative attitudes towards reformers; while those low in social
dominance orientation showcased more positive attitudes towards reformers. See Figure
6.

Figure 6. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Social Dominance Orientation, With
Controls. Error bars represent ± 1standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of
the three equations is as follows:
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .019*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .582

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .020*

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
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social dominance orientation, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the
dependent variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB
interaction (and not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we
look only at the p values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the
coefficient of the MSXB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical
significance t(191) = 0.55, pβ MSXB = .582. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated
moderation are not met and we cannot proceed further.
System justification interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes,
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the
moderator of system justification (abbreviated SJS) at step 1. Linear regression results at
step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward reformers (B = 0.009, β =
0.009, SE = 0.082, t(193) = 0.113, p = .910), without controls, (B = 0.014, β = 0.013, SE
= 0.079, t(189) = 0.172, p = .864), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.102, β = 0.096,
SE = 0.082, t(193) = 1.243, p = .215), without controls; (B = 0.064, β = 0.061, SE =
0.081, t(189) = 0.792, p = .430),with all controls (see Table 26 and 27).
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Table 26. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of System Justification, Without
Controls, Study 2
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
System justification (SJS)
US X SJS
MS X SJS
Constant

Step 1
SE B

B

.009
.102
.383***
—
—
-.037

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.082
.082
.067
—
—
.058

β

B

Step 2
SE B

β

.009
.096
.383
—
—
—

-.011
.110
.337**
-.185
.398*
-.032

.080
.080
.121
.158
.169
.057

-.011
.104
.337
-.117
.218
—

.151 (.138)
11.447***

.210 (.189)
7.073**

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Table 27. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of System Justification, With
Controls, Study 2
Variable

B

Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
System Justification (SJS)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)

.014
.064
.296***
-.043
.087
-.121
.360**

US X SJS
MS X SJS
Constant

—
—
-.026

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 1
SE B
.079
.081
.068
.098
.096
.119
.126
—
—
.056
.231 (.203)
8.117***

β

B

Step 2
SE B

.013
.061
.296
-.043
.087
-.121
.360

-.003
.076
.273*
-.035
.074
-.130
.344**

.077
.080
.118
.095
.094
.116
.123

-.003
.071
.273
-.035
.074
-.130
.344

—
—
—

-.181
.339*
-.024

.154
.166
.056

-.114
.186
—

.277 (.242)
5.897**

β
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of system justification in the model
without controls (B = 0.383, β = 0.383, SE = 0.067, t(193) = 5.715, p < .001), such that
participants who were low in system justification exhibited more positive attitudes
towards reformers, and those who were high in system justification exhibited more
negative attitudes towards reformers. When controls were entered into the model, this
effect remained significant, (B = 0.296 β = 0.296, SE = 0.068, t(189) = 4.385, p < .001,
with all controls). The control variable of threat thoughts was statistically significant in
the step 1 control model (B = 0.360, β = 0.360, SE = 0.126, t(189) = 2.850, p = .005),
such that increases in threat thoughts were associated with more negative attitudes
towards reformers.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between the MS and
system justification predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = 0.398, β
= 0.218, SE = 0.169, t(191) = 2.361, p = .019), which remained significant when all
controls were entered into the model(B = 0.339, β = 0.186, SE = 0.186, t(187) = 2.047, p
= .042). The interaction between the US and system justification predicting attitudes
towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.185, β = 0.117, SE = 0.158, t(191) = -1.166, p = .245), or with controls (B = -0.181, β = -0.114, SE
= 0.154 t(187) = -1.176, p = .241). The control variable of threat thoughts remained
statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.344, β = 0.344, SE = 0.123,
t(187) = 2.795, p = .006).
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the MS X System Justification
interaction, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in system justification,
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those primed with mortality salience exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers
(B = 0.309, β = 0.291, SE = 0.112, t(191) = 2.763, p = .006). With controls in the model,
the effect remained significant (B = 0.245 β = 0.231, SE = 0.111, t(187) = 2.203, p =
.029). Statistical significance was not achieved for participants low in system justification
when primed with mortality salience, without controls (B = -0.089, β = -0.084, SE =
0.121, t(191) = -0.739, p = .461); with controls (B = -0.094, β = -0.088, SE = 0.118,
t(187) = -0.793, p = .429). See Figure 7.

Figure 7. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by System Justification, With Controls. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here are
identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of the three equations
is as follows:
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .019*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .140

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .048*

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
system justification, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB interaction (and
not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p
values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
MSxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) =
1.48, pβ MSXB = .140. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not
met and we do not proceed further down this line of inquiry.
Intolerance of uncertainty interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy
codes, in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along
with the moderator of intolerance of uncertainty (abbreviated IUS) at step 1. Linear
regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward
reformers, (B = -0.059, β = -0.056, SE = 0.084, t(193) = -0.700, p = .485), without
controls, (B = -0.037, β = -0.035, SE = 0.081, t(189) = -0.450, p = .654), with all
controls), nor for MS (B = 0.042, β = 0.040, SE = 0.085, t(193) = 0.501, p = .617),
without controls; (B = 0.017, β = 0.016, SE = 0.084, t(189) = 0.203, p = .839),with all
controls (see Tables 28 and 29).
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Table 28. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Intolerance of Uncertainty,
Without Controls, Study 2
Step 1
SE B

β

.084
.085

-.056
.040

.272*** .069
—
—
—
—
.006
.060

.272
—
—
—

Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Intolerance of uncertainty
(IUS)
US X IUS
MS X IUS
Constant

B
-.059
.042

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

Step 2
SE B

β

-.061
.040

.083
.084

-.058
.038

.426**
-.378*
-.005
.007

.127
.166
.177
.059

.426
-.241
-.003
—

B

.081 (.067)
5.684**

.115 (.092)
3.662*

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Table 29. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Intolerance of Uncertainty, With
Controls, Study 2
B

Step 1
SE B

β

B

Step 2
SE B

β

-.037
.017
.121
-.051
.063
-.124
.414**
—
—
.007

.081
.084
.077
.102
.103
.124
.133
—
—
.058

-.035
.016
.121
-.051
.063
-.124
.414
—
—
—

-.040
.019
.279*
-.064
.033
-.112
.404**
-.315+
-.045
.007

.081
.083
.132
.101
.103
.124
.132
.164
.173
.058

-.038
.018
.279
-.064
.033
-.112
.404
-.201
-.025
—

Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Intolerance of uncertainty (IUS)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X IUS
MS X IUS
Constant
R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

.164 (.133)
5.292***

.184 (.144)
2.274
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of intolerance of uncertainty predicting
attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.272, β = 0.272, SE =
0.069, t(193) = 3.937, p < .001), such that participants with high levels of intolerance of
uncertainty exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those with low
levels of intolerance of uncertainty exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers.
When controls were entered into the model, this effect was not significant, (B = 0.121, β
= 0.121, SE = 0.077, t(189) = 1.573, p = .117, with all controls). The control variable of
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.414, β =
0.414, SE = 0.133, t(189) = 3.111, p = .002), such that increases in threat thoughts were
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and
intolerance of uncertainty predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = 0.378, β = -0.241, SE = 0.166, t(191) = -2.277, p = .024), which became marginally
significant when all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.315, β = -0.201, SE =
0.164, t(187) = -1.926, p = .056). The interaction between the MS and intolerance of
uncertainty predicting attitudes towards reformers did not yield significant results without
controls (B = -0.005, β = -0.003, SE = 0.177, t(191) = -0.027, p = .979), or with controls
(B = -0.045, β = -0.025, SE = 0.173, t(187 ) = -0.261, p = .794). The control variable of
threat thoughts remained statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.404, β
= 0.404, SE = 0.132, t(187) = 3.058, p = .003).
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Intolerance of Uncertainty
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in
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intolerance of uncertainty, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited more positive
attitudes towards reformers (B = -0.249, β = -0.237, SE = 0.118, t(191) = -2.115, p =
.036). With controls in the model, the effect became marginally significant (B = -0.198 β
= -0.188, SE = 0.116, t(187) = -1.702, p = .090). Statistical significance was not achieved
for participants low in intolerance of uncertainty when primed with uncertainty salience
without controls (B = 0.128, β = 0.122, SE = 0.117, t(191) = 1.099, p = .273), or with
controls (B = 0.117, β = 0.112, SE = 0.114, t(187) = 1.031, p = .304). See Figure 8.

Figure 8. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, With
Controls. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of
the three equations is as follows:
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .024*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .184

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .007**

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
intolerance of uncertainty, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the
dependent variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB
interaction (and not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we
look only at the p values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the
coefficient of the USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical
significance t(191) = -1.33, pβ USXB = .184. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated
moderation are not met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced
in magnitude, disqualifying mediated moderation.
Political self-efficacy interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes,
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the
moderator of political self-efficacy (abbreviated PSE) at step 1. Linear regression results
at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward reformers, (B = -0.046, β
= -0.044, SE = 0.087, t(193) = -0.528, p = .598), without controls, (B = -0.034, β = 0.033, SE = 0.082, t(189) = -0.417, p = .677), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.039, β
= 0.037, SE = 0.087, t(193) = 0.448, p = .655), without controls; (B = 0.014, β = 0.013,
SE = 0.084, t(189) = 0.168, p = .866),with all controls (see Tables 30 and 31).
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Table 30. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Self-Efficacy,
Without Controls, Study 2
Variable

Step 1
SE B

B

Uncertainty salience (US)
-.046 .087
Mortality salience (MS)
.039
.087
Political self-efficacy (PSE) .128+ .072
US X PSE
MS X PSE
Constant

—
—
.003

β
-.044
.037
.128

—
—
.062

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

Step 2
SE B

B

—
—
—

-.063
.040
.354**
.471**
-.204
.000

.024 (.008)
1.553

β

.086
.087
.125

-.060
.038
.354

.176
.173
.061

-.270
-.121
—

.059 (.035)
3.613*

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Table 31. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Self-Efficacy, With
Controls, Study 2
B

Step 1
SE B

β

B

Step 2
SE B

β

-.034
.014
-.020
-.059
.103
-.143
.471***
—
—
.007

.082
.084
.073
.102
.101
.124
.132
—
—
.058

-.033
.013
-.020
-.059
.103
-.143
.471
—
—
—

-.052
.022
.234+
-.090
.118
-.137
.478***
-.487**
-.266
.004

.081
.083
.121
.101
.099
.123
.131
.166
.165
.057

-.049
.020
.234
-.090
.118
-.137
.478
-.279
-.158
—

Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Political self-efficacy (PSE)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X PSE
MS X PSE
Constant
R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

.153 (.122)
4.888***

.191 (.152)
4.313*
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Step 1 revealed a marginally significant main effect of political self-efficacy
predicting attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.128, β = 0.128,
SE = 0.072, t(193) = 1.788, p = .075), such that participants with high levels of political
self-efficacy exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those with low
levels of political self-efficacy exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. When
controls were entered into the model, this effect was not significant, (B = -0.020, β = 0.020, SE = 0.073, t(189) = -0.273, p = .785, with all controls). The control variable of
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.471, β =
0.471, SE = 0.132, t(189) = 3.554, p < .001), such that increases in threat thoughts were
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant US by political self-efficacy
interaction predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.471(Yes, this
coefficient is also .471, not a typo), β = -0.270, SE = 0.176, t(191) = -2.678, p = .008),
which remained significant when all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.487, β =
-0.279, SE = 0.166, t(187) = -2.934, p = .004). The interaction between MS and political
self-efficacy predicting attitudes towards reformers did not yield significant results
without controls (B = -0.204, β = -0.121, SE = 0.173, t(191) = -1.180, p = .239), or with
controls (B = -0.266, β = -0.158, SE = 0.165, t(187) = -1.617, p = .108). The control
variable of threat thoughts remained statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B
= 0.478, β = 0.478, SE = 0.131, t(187) = 3.661, p < .001).
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Political Self-Efficacy
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in
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political self-efficacy, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited more positive/less
negative attitudes towards reformers (B = -0.299, β = -0.284, SE = 0.127, t(191) = -2.346,
p = .020). With controls in the model, the effect remained significant (B = -0.295 β = 0.280, SE = 0.120, t(187) = -2.454, p = .015). Statistical significance was not achieved for
participants low in political self-efficacy when primed with uncertainty salience without
controls (B = 0.172, β = 0.164, SE = 0.119, t(191) = 1.452, p = .148), and was marginally
significant with controls (B = 0.192, β = 0.182, SE = 0.111, t(187) = 1.720, p = .087). See
Figure 9.

Figure 9. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitude Towards Reformers, Moderated by Political Self-Efficacy, With Controls. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of
the three equations is as follows:
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .008**

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .969

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .005**

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
political self-efficacy, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and
not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
USXB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = 0.04, pβ USXB = .969, and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not
met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude,
disqualifying mediated moderation.
Trust in government interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes,
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the
moderator of trust in government (abbreviated TG) at step 1. Linear regression results at
step 1 revealed no significant effect of uncertainty condition versus the control dummy
code on attitudes toward reformers, (B = -0.018, β = -0.017, SE = 0.088, t(193) = -0.023,
p = .839), without controls, (B = -0.016, β = -0.015, SE = 0.083, t(189) = -0.189, p =
.851), with all controls), nor for the mortality salience versus control dummy code (B =
0.060, β = 0.057, SE = 0.087, t(193) = 0.694, p = .488), without controls; (B = 0.025, β =
0.024, SE = 0.084, t(189) = 0.296, p = .768), with all controls (see Tables 32 and 33).
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Table 32. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Trust in Government,
Without Controls, Study 2
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Trust in government (TG)
US X TG
MS X TG
Constant

B

Step 1
SE B

β

B

Step 2
SE B

-.018
.060
.177*
—
—
-.014

.088
.087
.072
—
—
.062

-.017
.057
.177
—
—
—

-.033
.075
.348**
-.438*
-.059
-.031

.087
.086
.122
.171
.176
.062

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.038 (.023)
2.522+

β
-.032
.070
.348
-.259
-.033
—

.075 (.051)
3.843*

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Table 33. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Trust in Government, With
Controls, Study 2
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Trust in government (TG)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X TG
MS X TG
Constant

Step 1
SE B

B
-.016
.025
.086
-.074
.098
-.135
.448**
—
—
-.003

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.159 (.128)
5.124***

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

.083
.084
.071
.102
.100
.124
.130
—
—
.059

β

B

-.015
.024
.086
-.074
.098
-.135
.448
—
—
—

-.028
.045
.262*
-.095
.113
-.132
.435**
-.403*
-.096
-.022

Step 2
SE B
.082
.084
.118
.102
.099
.123
.130
.163
.170
.059
.188 (.149)
3.316*

β
-.026
.043
.262
-.095
.113
.-132
.435
-.238
-.053
—
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of trust in government predicting
attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.177, β = 0.177, SE =
0.072, t(193) = 2.466, p = .015), such that participants with high levels of trust in
government exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those with low
levels of trust in government exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. When
controls were entered into the model, this effect was not significant, (B = 0.086, β =
0.086, SE = 0.071, t(189) = 1.214, p = .226, with all controls). The control variable of
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.448, β =
0.448, SE = 0.130, t(189) = 3.444, p = .001), such that increases in threat thoughts were
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and
trust in government predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.438, β
= -0.259, SE = 0.171, t(191) = -2.559, p = .011), which remained significant when all
controls were entered into the model(B = -0.403, β = -0.238, SE = 0.163, t(187) = -2.466,
p = .015). The interaction between MS and trust in government predicting attitudes
towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.059, β = 0.033, SE = 0.176, t(191) = -0.338, p = .736), or with controls (B = -0.096, β = -0.053, SE
= 0.170, t(187 ) = -0.568, p = .571). The control variable of threat thoughts remained
statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.435, β = 0.435, SE = 0.130,
t(187) = 3.360, p = .001).
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Trust in Government
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in trust
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in government, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited more positive attitudes
towards reformers (B = -0.252, β = -0.240, SE = 0.123, t(191) = -2.049, p = .042). With
controls in the model, the effect became marginally significant (B = -0.229 β = -0.218, SE
= 0.117, t(187) = -1.951, p = .053). Statistical significance was not achieved for
participants low in trust in government when primed with uncertainty salience without
controls (B = 0.185, β = 0.176, SE = 0.121, t(191) = 1.535, p = .126), or with controls (B
= 0.174, β = 0.165, SE = 0.115, t(187) = 1.514, p = .132). See Figure 10.

Figure 10. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Trust in Government, With Controls. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of
the three equations is as follows:
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .011*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .436

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .022*

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of trust
in government, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and
not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the
USXB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = 0.78, pβ USXB = .436. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not
met.
Predicting Support for Regime Change
Belief in a just world interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes,
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the
moderator of belief in a just world (abbreviated BJW) at step 1. Linear regression results
at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on regime change, (B = 0.061, β = 0.058, SE
= 0.089, t(193) = 0.692, p = .490), without controls, (B = 0.067, β = 0.063, SE = 0.089,
t(189) = 0.744, p = .458), with all controls), nor for MS (B = -0.009, β = -0.008, SE =
0.088, t(193) = -0.097, p = .923), without controls; (B = -0.015, β = -0.014, SE = 0.091,
t(189) = -0.161, p = .872), with all controls (see Tables 34 and 35). Step 1 did not include
a significant main effect of belief in a just world predicting regime change in the model
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without controls (B = -0.005, β = -0.005, SE = 0.073, t(193) = -0.064, p = .949). When
controls were entered into the model, this effect remained non-significant, (B = -0.006 β
= -0.006, SE = 0.077, t(189) = 0.074, p = .941, with all controls).
Table 34. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Belief in a Just World, Without
Controls, Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Belief in a just world
(BJW)
US X BJW
MS X BJW
Constant

Step 2

B

SE B

.061
-.009

.089
.088

.058
-.008

-.005
—
—
-.018

.073
—
—
.063

-.005
—
—
—

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

β

.004 (-.011)
.261

B

SE B

.042
.001
.158
-.481**
.058
-.032

β

.087
.087

.040
.001

.130
.174
.180
.062

.158
-.295
.033
—

.064 (.040)
6.159**

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and
belief in a just world predicting regime change, without controls (B = -0.481, β = -0.295,
SE = 0.174, t(191) = -2.772, p = .006), which remained significant when all controls were
entered into the model(B = -0.487, β = -0.299, SE = 0.176, t(187) = -2.763, p = .006). The
interaction between MS and belief in a just world predicting regime change did not yield
significant results without controls (B = 0.058, β = 0.033, SE = 0.180, t(191) = 0.322, p =
.748), or with controls (B = 0.070, β = 0.039, SE = 0.183, t(187) = 0.383, p = .702).
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Table 35. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Belief on a Just World, With Controls,
Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Belief in a just world (BJW)
System Justification (SJS)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X BJW
MS X BJW
Constant

B

SE B

.067
-.015
.006
.115
.033
-.052
-.109
—
—
-.018

.089
.091
.077
.111
.108
.134
.142
—
—
.064

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

Step 2
β
.063
-.014
.006
.115
.033
-.052
-.109
—
—
—

.013 (-.023)
.358

B

SE B

β

.047
< .001
.173
.107
.053
-.062
-.130
-.487**
.070
-.034

.087
.090
.134
.108
.106
.131
.138
.176
.183
.063

.044
.000
.173
.107
.053
-.062
-.130
-.299
.039
—

.076 (.031)
6.353**

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Belief in a Just World
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those with a lower
belief in a just world, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited a greater support
for regime change (B = 0.283, β = 0.269, SE = 0.123, t(191) = 2.298, p = .023). With
controls in the model, the effect was also statistically significant (B = 0.290 β = 0.276, SE
= 0.124, t(187) = 2.334, p = .021).Statistical significance was not achieved for those with
a stronger belief in a just world primed with uncertainty salience without controls (B = 0.198, β = -0.188, SE = 0.122, t(191) = -1.619, p = .107), or with controls (B = -0.197, β
= -0.187, SE = 0.124, t(187) = -1.586, p = .114). See Figure 11.

137

Figure 11. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Regime Change, Moderated by Belief in a Just World, With Controls. Error bars
represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of
the three equations is as follows:
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .006**

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .527

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .012*

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of
belief in a just world, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of regime change. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not the
MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p values
corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the USxB
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interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = 0.63, pβ
USXB =

.527. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not met.
Trust in government interaction. Step 1. The two condition dummy codes of (a)

uncertainty versus control and (b) mortality salience versus control, were entered along
with trust in government at step 1, as were controls. Linear regression results at step 1
revealed no significant effect of uncertainty condition versus the control dummy code on
regime change, (B = 0.056, β = 0.054, SE = 0.089, t(193) = 0.634, p = .527), without
controls, (B = 0.060, β = 0.057, SE = 0.090, t(189) = 0.673, p = .502), with all controls),
nor for the mortality salience versus control dummy code (B = -0.010, β = -0.010, SE =
0.088, t(193) = -0.115, p = .908), without controls; (B = -0.019, β = -0.018, SE = 0.091,
t(189) = -0.203, p = .839), with all controls (see Tables 36 and 37).
Table 36. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Trust in Government, Without Controls,
Study 2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Trust in government (TG)
US X TG
MS X TG
Constant

B

SE B

.056
-.010
-.026
—
—
-.016

.089
.088
.073
—
—
.063

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

.005 (-.011)
.302

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 2
β
.054
-.010
-.026
—
—
—

B

SE B

β

.043
.001
.108
-.351*
-.036
-.029

.089
.088
.125
.175
.180
.063

.041
.001
.108
-.208
-.020
—

.029 (.004)
2.421+
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Table 37. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Trust in Government, With Controls, Study
2
Step 1
Variable
Uncertainty salience (US)
Mortality salience (MS)
Trust in Government (TG)
Death thoughts (DT)
Anxious thoughts (AT)
Insecure thoughts (IT)
Threat thoughts (TT)
US X TG
MS X TG
Constant

B
.060
-.019
-.026
.119
.034
-.054
-.103
—
—
-.014

R2 (R2 Adj)
F Change in R2

Step 2

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

.090
.091
.077
.111
.109
.134
.141
—
—
.064

.057
-.018
-.026
.119
.034
-.054
-.103
—
—
—

.047
-.002
.115
.098
.046
-.054
-.111
-.354*
-.040
-.030

.090
.091
.128
.111
.108
.134
.141
.178
.185
.064

.044
-.002
.115
.098
.046
-.054
-.111
-.209
-.022
—

.014 (-.023)
.374

.038 (-.008)
2.368+

Note. Referent group for Condition = Control.
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Step 1 did not include a significant main effect of trust in government predicting
regime change in the model without controls (B = -0.026, β = -0.026, SE = 0.073, t(193)
= -0.354, p = .724). When controls were entered into the model, this effect remained nonsignificant, (B = -0.026 β = -0.026, SE = 0.077, t(189) = -0.337, p = .736, with all
controls).
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between the
uncertainty salience condition dummy code and trust in government predicting regime
change, without controls (B = -0.351, β = -0.208, SE = 0.175, t(191) = -2.005, p = .046),
which remained significant when all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.354, β =
-0.209, SE = 0.178, t(187) = -1.992, p = .048). The interaction between the mortality
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salience dummy code and trust in government predicting regime change did not yield
significant results without controls (B = -0.036, β = 0.020, SE = 0.180, t(191) = -0.202, p
= .840), or with controls (B = -0.040, β = -0.022, SE = 0.185, t(187) = -0.216, p = .829).
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the Uncertainty Salience X Trust in
Government interaction; for those low in trust of government, being primed with
uncertainty causes an increase in support for regime change, without controls, (B = 0.219,
β = 0.208, SE = 0.124, t(191) = 1.768, p = .079). With controls in the model, the effect
remained marginally significant (B = 0.224, β = 0.213, SE = 0.125, t(187) = 1.793, p =
.075). Statistical significance was not achieved for those with a stronger trust in
government primed with uncertainty salience without controls (B = -0.133, β = -0.126, SE
= 0.126, t(191) = -1.051, p = .295), or with controls (B = -0.130, β = -0.124, SE = 0.128,
t(187) = -1.019, p = .309). See Figure 12.

Figure 12. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of
Regime Change, Moderated by Trust in Government, With Controls. Error bars represent
± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.
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Mediated moderation. Basic criteria for establishing mediated moderation are
identical to that described previously, as set by Muller et al. (2005), Bucy & Tao (2007).
Accordingly, the significance of the three equations is as follows:
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .046*

(1)

M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .436

(2)

Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .062

(3)

Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS”
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of trust
in goverment, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent
variable of regime change. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not the
MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p values
corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the USxB
interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = -0.78, pβ
USXB =

.436, and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not met.

Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude,
disqualifying mediated moderation as a possibility.

CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1(H1) posited that heightened uncertainty salience, independent of
other factors, would cause participants to exhibit an increased preference for the status
quo and related constructs. Contrary to expectations, the predicted main effects of
uncertainty and mortality salience on status quo preference, attitudes towards reformers,
and support for regime change, did not emerge in either study.
Hypothesis 2
In all cases discussed hereafter, the words “higher” and “more” are spoken with
reference to the significant effects in the primed condition of interest, compared with the
control. Hypothesis 2(H2) as described previously denotes a set of hypotheses broken
down into three parts. The Basic premise of Hypothesis 2 posits that heightened affective
experiences (as caused by the US and MS primes, but initially predicted a-priori
primarily for US) interacting with a set of selected moderating factors, would cause
participants to exhibit an increased preference for the status quo and related constructs in
a multiplicative manner (producing interaction effects). The three sets of Hypotheses 2(x,
y, z) represent the unique effects predicted for the different conceptual categories of
moderators used in this study, with Hypothesis 2(x) denoting individual differences in
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uncertainty sensitivity, H2(y) denoting differences in system justifying attitudes and
worldviews, and H2(z) denoting differences in non-ideological sociopolitical factors.
H2(x). With respect to Hypothesis 2(x), the only statistically significant effect
occurred in Study 2, with a significant US x IUS (intolerance of uncertainty scale)
interaction (though this effect dropped to marginal significance when controls were
entered into the model). The effect was such that in the uncertainty condition, those
highly intolerant of uncertainty exhibited heightened positive attitudes towards reformers
compared to baseline. This effect did not emerge in study 1, was not predicted, and so
any discussion of this effect is merely post-hoc speculation. Our theoretical model
predicts that if such an interaction were to occur, those who are intolerant of uncertainty
should exhibit more negative attitudes towards reformers. More research is needed to
determine whether or not this effect is replicable, or a statistical artifact. In any case,
Hypothesis 2(x) did not garner evidence in its favor.
H2(y). Hypothesis 2(y) predicted that variables related to system justifying
attitudes and worldviews would moderate the effects of H1 in such a way that those high
on system justifying worldviews should exhibit, under priming conditions, a
magnification/polarization of baseline attitudinal preferences, sometimes referred to in
the literature as an “extremity effect.” This in contrast to an effect such as a “conservative
shift,” which predicts attitudinal preferences pushed in one specific direction.
Let us examine the following significance effects which emerged, each which
speak to Hypothesis 2(y). A persistent pattern was found across studies, showcased most
clearly with the regression model using political ideology (PIDEO) as the moderator and
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attitudes towards reformers. In both experiments, political ideology interacted with
experimentally manipulated conditions to predict attitudes towards reformers in an
identical fashion, establishing the consistency of this effect across multiple priming
methods (see Figure 1, compare to Figure 5). As expected, both with and without
controls, political ideology predicted attitudes towards reformers such that liberals
exhibited heightened positive attitudes towards reformers under conditions of mortality
salience. The nature and direction of this effect was predicted a-priori, though it was
expected to occur to a larger degree in the uncertainty condition, as opposed to the
mortality salience condition. As evidenced by the plot of estimated means, the effect did
occur in the uncertainty salience condition as well, though effects in that condition are
not statistically significance in either experiment 1 or 2 with respect to this specific
regression set. Regarding the significant MS x Political Ideology interaction, the effect is
driven primarily by leftist/liberals (in experiment 1) at the statistically significant level,
though, a nonsignificant effect in the predicted direction can be observed for rightwing/conservatives as well. For this same regression set in experiment 2, none of the
simple slopes reached the threshold of statistical significance, but the pattern of means
does replicate experiment 1 quite nicely. This identical pattern was achieved across both
studies when political ideology was entered as the moderator.
Similarly patterned effects emerged for other variables in the system justifying
attitudes and worldviews category, though not replicating across both studies. In
experiment 2, social dominance orientation (SDO) exhibited a parallel pattern of
polarization in the mortality salience condition. When exposed to the mortality salience
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prime, the baseline effect became magnified for both those high and low in SDO (see
Figure 6). When scores on the region specific (American) System Justification Scale
(SJS) were entered as a moderator into the regression, again the same pattern, predicted
by Hypothesis H2(y) emerged. Both generally, and within the control condition, those
high in SJS disliked reformers more than their low SJS counterparts. When primed with
MS, the effect became polarized at both ends, though primarily driven by those high in
SJS (see Figure 7). Additionally, speaking to H2(y), an effect emerged in study 2 with
regards to the Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale and the dependent variable of support
for regime change. When this variable was entered into the equation as moderator, a
significant effect emerged in the uncertainty condition, such that those low in BJW
exhibited an increase in favorable attitudes towards regime change, the opposite being
true for those high in BJW (see Figure 11).
A significant regression with respect to the dependent variable of Status Quo
Preference Scale occurred in experiment 2 with political ideology as the moderator (see
Figure 3). This regression produced a US x Moderator interaction, such that in the
uncertainty condition, pre-existing attitudes again became polarized in the predicted
fashion under priming. That is to say, right wing/conservatives’ exhibited more negative
attitudes towards reformers, and left wing/conservatives exhibited less negative attitudes.
Decomposition of this interaction revealed that the significant effect was driven by
conservative participants at the statistically significant level. Additionally, the variable of
Party Identification produced a pattern duplicate to that described above (US x Party).
Decomposition of this interaction revealed that the significant effect was driven by
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Republican identifying participants, though a polarization on both sides of the isle is
evident. In each case described above, the magnitude and direction of the effect coincides
with the a-priori predictions provided by H2(y).
Hypothesis 2(z). Hypothesis 2(z) predicted that variables related to nonideological sociopolitical indicators would moderate H1 effects in such a way that those
who generally feel more politically involved and efficacious should exhibit a
magnification/polarization of their baseline response; though this set of hypotheses was
relatively more exploratory and peripheral compared to H2(x, y). Let us now discuss the
effects which emerged relevant to this hypothesis grouping.
In study 1, a marginally significant US x Attention to politics effect emerged,
such that those high in attention exhibited heightened negative attitudes towards
reformers when primed with uncertainty. This effect was neither predicted by H2(z),
statistically significant at the p < .05 level in the decomposition of simple slopes, or
replicated across studies. Thus, we are inclined to consider this a spurious effect, or at
least one which falls outside the theoretical scope of this dissertation.
In study 2, a US x political self-efficacy (PSE) interaction emerged. This effect
was such that when primed with uncertainty, those high in political self-efficacy
exhibited heightened positive attitudes towards reformers, an effect consistent with
H2(z). Also in study 2, a US x Trust in Government(TG) effect emerged such that, when
primed with uncertainty, those highly trusting of government exhibited heightened
attitudes towards reformers relative to baseline. This effect was not hypothesized, and the
direction of the effect runs contrary to H2(z) (we would predict low trust to correlate with
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more favorable attitudes toward reformers). Finally, a US x Trust in Government (TG)
effect emerged with support for regime change as the dependent variable, such that those
highly trusting of government became less supportive of regime change when primed
with uncertainty relative to baseline. This effect is consistent with H2(z). We note,
however, that the variable of Trust in Government was the one moderator variable not
evenly distributed across conditions, and thus was correlated with the primed independent
variable. Because of this, an assumption of interactive regression models was violated
when employing this variable as a moderator (IV and moderator should be uncorrelated
in such models), and thus conclusions with respect to this moderator should be met with
caution. Overall, empirical support for the hypothesis 2(z) grouping is rather paltry.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 as described previously denotes a set of hypotheses broken down
into three parts (x, y, z) corresponding to their respective moderator variable grouping
discussed in the previous section. Hypothesis 3 posits that heightened uncertainty
salience and the thirteen individual difference moderators should cause participants to
exhibit an increased preference for the status quo and related constructs in an additive
manner (producing independent, non-interacting effects). Since there were essentially no
main effects of the manipulated independent variable in any of the studies contained
herein, and the many predicted multiplicative effects were observed as described
throughout, hypothesis 3 appears to have garnered no empirical support.
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Hypothesis Summary
The lack of main effects in either of the two studies suggests a refutation of
hypothesis 1, without moderator interactions. This is theoretically interesting for a
number of reasons. Studies within the uncertainty management literature (Hogg: 2000,
2004, 2005) and also the terror management literature (see Greenberg et al. 2008, for a
review) employed independent variable manipulations identical to those used herein, and
consistently produced main effects of these manipulations upon dependent variables
relevant to the overarching theme of cultural worldviews, norms and values in a manner
consistent with Hypothesis 1 as described herein.
The lack of replication of these established effects may be considered surprising.
Even when an identical independent variable manipulation was utilized (the LEI in
experiment 1), main effects failed to emerge. Thus, to some extent this could be
considered a “fail to replicate” scenario. There are, however, notable differences between
the present studies and the cited predecessors which may explain the non-replication. As
noted earlier, the previous studies did not explicitly involve status quo preference related
measures. Therefore, it is not altogether surprising that established effects of the
independent variable manipulation did not translate to a new type of dependent variable.
Moreover, the effects of transporting the experiment out of university psychology
laboratories and into a remotely conducted internet survey should not be overlooked as a
factor. Systematic research on the effects of taking surveys in-person vs. online is a
fruitful area of future research which could prove both theoretically informative, as well
as pragmatic. Recent reviews of the subject of differences in participant pool
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characteristics between in-person college samples and Mturk participants, however,
suggest that the populations behave more or less similarly (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014).
Thus, we are disinclined to the idea that such differences (in the processing of materials,
and characteristics of participant samples) between those studies and my own are the
primary reason for a lack of main effects in these two experiments; though with such a
new method for obtaining participants (Mturk), there may be systematic differences yet
to be detected between populations.
Our dependent variables aimed to capture status quo preference and related
manifestations (attitudes towards reformers, support for regime change), not preference
for cultural worldviews or norms. We surmised that the findings pertinent to the latter
would extend onto the former, but it was not a foregone conclusion. We expected the
results regarding cultural worldviews and norms to extend to status quo preference type
measures as a result of the high level of conceptual overlap among constructs in these
categories. Namely, since the norms and worldviews espoused by a given culture
represent the status quo of that culture, one might expect that similar effects might be
achieved. On the other hand, a worldview or norm is different from an attitude, and
indeed many participants (e.g. right leaning or Republican identifying participants during
the current Obama administration) may feel that the political status quo as they
understand it is directly counter to their worldviews.
Caveats and Mitigating Factors
Recent discussions within the social science community present a strong case for
requiring multiple replications of an effect prior to making bold claims of causality.
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Previously well-established priming effects have failed to produce effects in recent
replication attempts, suggesting to some that unseen procedural idiosyncrasies may exert
a larger influence on results than previously imagined, hindering successful replication
attempts, highlighting the capricious nature of some results, and casting longstanding
theoretical conclusions into doubt (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Stroebe & Strack,
2014). The remedy to this problem is engaging repeated exact procedural replications, as
well as varied conceptual replications. The corroboration of effects with respect to the
moderator of political ideology across both studies mitigates some of these concerns, as
the theoretically predicted effect emerged in an identical fashion across two different
implementations of the independent variable manipulation. Additionally, similarly
patterned interaction effects emerged with regards to several of the variables in the
system justifying attitudes and worldviews category, suggesting that the discussed effects
relevant to hypothesis H2(y) were not flukes, particularly for the key variable of political
ideology and related variables.
Experimentwise type I error presents itself as a concern here, as 13 Moderator
Variables x 3 Dependent Variables (this is taking into account only the models with all
controls) produces 39 comparisons in each experiment. The amount of statistical
comparisons performed herein could be considered excessive, inevitably leading to some
type I error. For each study, the likelihood of producing at least one false positive is
governed by the formula,

(Shaffer, 1995), where 1- (1-.05)^(39) = .86. In

other words, it is approximately 86% likely that at least one false positive emerges in
each study, due to the sheer volume of statistical models fielded. In study 1, the US x
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Attention effect is unpredicted, not consistent with known theories, and does not emerge
again in study 2. Such factors lead us to conclude that it is highly likely the effect is
spurious. In study 2, a couple interaction effects relevant to H2(z) emerged, yet they were
sparse and the significant US x TG effect with respect to attitudes towards reformers
emerged contrary to H2(z). With respect to support for regime change, the significant US
x TG interaction did support H2(z), however this is the only evidence throughout in
support of this hypothesis, and due to the uneven distribution/random assignment of trust
in government across conditions in experiment 2, any conclusions here should be met
cautiously.
H2(y) appears to have garnered support across studies with respect to political
ideology as the moderator, and within experiment 2 among conceptually related variables
in the system justifying attitudes and worldviews grouping. It could be said that drawing
conclusions from study 2 with respect to H2(y) relevant effects should be approached
cautiously, as they do not replicate in study 1. However, the characteristic predicted
pattern of the effect among conceptually related moderator variables may be considered
evidence supporting the robustness of this family of effects. If these effects were a result
of experimentwise type I error, then it would be highly unlikely that a nearly identical
pattern would manifest repeatedly, and that this pattern would happen by chance to
manifest in accordance with the a-priori predictions of H2(y). Thus, for individuals high
on system justifying attitudes and worldviews, exposure to mortality salience and/or
uncertainty salience polarizes pre-existing attitudes. The case for this effect is most
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evident with respect to the moderating variable of Political Ideology, with attitudes
towards reformers as the dependent variable, as replicated across experiments.
Terror Managements Versus Uncertainty Management
In its initial conception, part of the intent of the present project was to corroborate
findings such as those of Van den Bos et al. (2005) in demonstrating the greater strength
and applicability of uncertainty salience manipulations relative to mortality salience
manipulations. It is important to note that the formally hypothesized effects initially
presented herein allowed for MS x Moderator interactions, yet the hypothesized effects
specifically concerned the US manipulation. Four out of seven significant findings in the
H2(y) family entailed a US x Moderator interaction, while three out of seven entailed a
MS x Moderator interaction. In the strict sense of having predicted effects primarily for
US (and not MS), one might feel justified in suggesting that support for the a-priori
formal hypotheses was somewhat lacking; though, in the eyes of the author, all of the
hypotheses were expected to manifest for both US and MS manipulations, as the previous
research upon which the extant studies are based was known to establish this pattern for
MS, though not with status quo preference relevant measures(status quo preference scale,
attitudes towards reformers, support for regime change) as the larger dependent variable
construct. The consistent pattern of MS/US x Moderator interactions speaking to H2(y)
showcase a predicted re-occurring pattern, lending credence to this family of hypotheses.
Across studies, the prime x political ideology interaction predicting attitudes
towards reformers manifested itself in the pattern predicted a-priori, H2(y), producing
what might be called an “extremity,” “magnification” or “polarization” effect, such that
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pre-existing relations between the moderator and the dependent variable became more
extreme under conditions of the prime. In each regression, either the MS x Moderator
emerged significant, or the US x Moderator interaction did, but never did both
interactions reach the threshold of statistical significance within the same model.
Final Thoughts
The results produced herein may be theoretically informative on a number of
accounts speaking to related, yet distinct lines of research within social psychology.
These findings could be seen as running somewhat contrary to the Van den Bos studies
reported in which the uncertainty salience effect repeatedly outshined the mortality
salience effect when using priming materials identical to those in experiment 1. In the
current experiments, mortality salience is demonstrated to be more or less equally strong
as uncertainty salience in producing significant effects. We found that out of the three
dependent variables, it was participants’ attitude towards reformers (the person enacting
change), which served as the dependent variable engendering most of the significant
effects. We suggest that this is no coincidence, but rather a result of judgments regarding
people themselves being characteristically different than those of abstract concepts or
hypothetical futures. This, however, is mere speculation and further research would be
needed to explore such an idea.
When exposed to the experimental primes, participants’ pre-existing proclivities
(on the moderating variables generally falling into the system justifying worldviews
category) became more extreme/polarized/magnified. Previous theoretical work has
discussed the idea that under conditions of high stress or cognitive load, both liberals’
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and conservatives’ attitudes become magnified, producing what have been in the past
referred to as “extremity effects.” Other theoretical frameworks suggest that situational
primes including those deployed herein should cause both liberals and conservatives to
simply become more conservative, an idea sometimes referred to as the “conservative
shift hypothesis.” The extant studies are thus informative with regards to this debate,
demonstrating extremity effects across a variety of related variables in this hypothesis
grouping H2(y), particularly that of political ideology. As far as the current author is
aware of, experiment 2 is the first to use a word search type exercise as a successful
method of concept priming. Many have heard the apocryphal tale of World War II
propaganda being disseminated to citizens of various nations via word searchs. The
extant results suggest that these kinds of word puzzles may indeed be quite an effective
technique. We found that it was sometimes Liberals (or those low in system justifying
worldviews and attitudes), and sometimes conservatives (or those exhibiting high levels
on this variable grouping) who exhibited the more pronounced polarization effect in each
specific case, as evidenced by the significance levels of the simple slopes analyses. It is
important to note, however, that in all cases the hypothesized directional pattern of means
was exhibited by both those on the left/liberal end of the spectrum and those on the
right/conservative end of the spectrum. In no case did the patter of means appear to affect
only one side of the continuum.
This finding may be of interest to those studying the interactive influence of
ideology and emotional processes on politically relevant attitudes. Some lines of research
suggest that the achieved effects would be expected to occur primarily among
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conservatives, as some studies find conservatives to be more emotionally reactive to
negative stimuli (Inbar, 2009). An emerging counterpoint to this idea, however, suggests
that those on the right are generally more “rigid” and less psychologically flexible;
(Pliskin et al. 2014, see Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010 for a review), thus predicting the
effects to be driven primarily by those low on system justifying views/liberals. In some
cases of significant effects relevant to H2(y), the situational prime demonstrated lesser
change/flexibility of attitudes among conservatives (and those who are high on system
justifying attitudes and worldviews generally), while in other instances the reverse was
true. In all cases, however, as evidenced by the figures, it appears that a
magnification/polarization of pre-existing attitudes occurred for both those low and high
on the moderator variable, even if one side (low or high) reached the threshold of
statistical significance while the other did not.
A diverse array of empirical research stemming from both psychology and
economics suggests that there exists a general tendency for people to prefer the status quo
over alternatives, all else being equal. This dissertation investigated such hypotheses
from a motivated cognition perspective, with the drive to retreat from uncertainty and
avoid death serving as the underlying motivating constructs. From the extant studies, we
find evidence in favor of the idea that terror management and uncertainty management
processes activate social cognitive mechanisms directly favoring the status quo (and,
specifically the individuals who uphold it), an effect heretofore not established in the
literature.
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In the face of death and uncertainty, it appears that people tend to “stick to their
guns.” According to Milburn & Conrad (1998), our reactions to such stimuli are shaped
as part of our socio-political development, with conservatives being least likely to
embrace change because they are less willing and motivated to believe that the world is
innately unjust. The polarization effects uncovered in the extant studies may shed some
light upon seemingly intractable conflicts in which escalation of hostilities appears
inevitable. Interpersonal and intergroup hostilities often escalate in a climate of scarce
resources and/or ongoing war, to the detriment of both belligerent parties. This study
demonstrates that situational triggers of death and uncertainty cause individuals to
polarize their attitudes; they do not relent, or shift in a unidirectional fashion (as
suggested by the “conservative shift” hypothesis). Polarization of pre-existing political
attitudes (or system justifying attitudes and worldviews more broadly) will likely
exacerbate, rather than alleviate conflict situations. Thus, situational primes of death and
uncertainty cause those already predisposed towards or against political reformers to
become more extreme in their views. Future research is warranted to investigate whether
or not the polarization effect holds for other kinds of primes by which a more ancestral
causal mechanism for the effect may be pinpointed (e.g. only negative valence primes,
only high arousal primes), or if the polarization effect occurs specifically within the
framework of “existentially relevant” constructs. Regardless, the current experiments
demonstrate that death and uncertainty fan the flames of pre-existing political views
regarding the status quo and those who aim to change it.

APPENDIX
SURVEY MEASURES
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Independent Measures.
(Condition A) Uncertainty Condition:
“INSTRUCTIONS: In this part of the study we are interested to see what people think
and feel when they are uncertain. Please read carefully the following two questions and
reply as honestly as you can. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; we are
interested in what YOU think and feel.
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your being uncertain
arouses in you.
[Free Response]
2) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will
happen to you as you feel uncertain.
[Free Response]”
(Condition B) Mortality Salience Condition:
“INSTRUCTIONS: In this part of the study we are interested to see what people think
and feel about death. Please read carefully the following two questions and reply as
honestly as you can. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in
what YOU think and feel.
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your death arouses in
you.
[ Free Response]
2) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will
happen to you as you die.
[Free Response]”
(Condition C) Control Condition:
“INSTRUCTIONS: In this part of the study we are interested to see what people think
and feel when they watch TV. Please read carefully the following two questions and
reply as honestly as you can. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; we are
interested in what YOU think and feel.
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your watching TV
arouses in you.
[ Free Response]
2) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will
happen to you as you watch TV.
[Free Response]”
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Scale: Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, short form)
INSTRUCTIONS: On this page there is a scale consisting of a number of words that
describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate
answer. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present
moment.
1 very slightly
2 a little
3 moderately
4 quite a bit
5 extremely
______ 1. Alert
______ 2. Afraid
______ 3. Active
______ 4. Upset
______ 5. Attentive
______ 6. Hostile
______ 7. Determined
______ 8. Nervous
______ 9. Ashamed
______ 10. Inspire
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Dependent Measures.
Scale: Preference for Change scale vs. Status Quo Scale (PFC).
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements
1 = Strongly Disagree
7 = Strongly Agree
1. Societal changes should be met with caution.
1 2 3 4
2. I like to do the same old things rather than try new and
1 2 3 4
different ones.
3. I prefer having a stable routine to experiencing changes 1 2 3 4
in my life.
4. Making major changes in society is usually not worth the
1 2 3 4
trouble.
5. I like things which are familiar, rather than that which is 1 2 3 4
different and unknown.
6. Staying the course is in life is necessary for success.
1 2 3 4
7. Generally, change is a negative thing.
1 2 3 4
8. Change in life usually comes with great costs.
1 2 3 4
9. When things don’t go according to plans, it stresses me
1 2 3 4
out.

5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5
5
5
5

Scale: Attitudes Toward Reformers.
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
disagree
slightly
Slightly
agree
strongly
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
1. Those who attempt to reform the system usually have ulterior motives.
2. Those who protest the political system are usually looking for handouts and
unrealistic quick fixes.
3. Protesters are often a bunch of brats looking for attention.
4. Mass protests and reformation movements are rarely thought out.
5. Revolutionaries usually end up being worse that those which they rail against.
6. Reformers and protesters are society’s great heroes.*

6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
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Scale: Support for Regime Change
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
disagree

3
slightly
disagree

4
Slightly
agree

5
agree

6
strongly
agree

1. When the political rulers of a country become ineffective, they should be removed
by any means necessary.
2. Though governments around the world often cause many problems for their citizens,
changing a political system through regime change usually ends badly.*
3. Governments around the world should take a look at the “Arab Spring” and get out
of the way for who is next.
4. In politics, I tend to support the underdog/challenger rather than the already
established candidate.
5. People should stop complaining about the government because whatever would
replace it will probably be worse.*
6. I like to see government change their leaders often, rather than rarely.
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Manipulation Check, Control and Potential Mediating Variables.
Manipulation Check:
INSTRUCTIONS: Recall from earlier the writing exercise at the beginning of the
survey.
Please rate the extent to which you were thinking about the following topics while
writing down your answers earlier.
(1 = did not think about at all, 7 = thought very much about)
1. Uncertainty
2. Watching T.V.
3. Death
Control and Potential Mediating Variables (aka Thoughts/Feeling Measures):
INSTRUCTIONS: Recall from earlier the writing exercise at the beginning of the
survey. Please rate the extent to which you thought about or felt the following while
writing down your answers earlier.
(1 = did not feel at all, 7 = felt very much)
1. I thought about or felt death and dying. ___
2. I thought about or felt anxious. ___
3. I thought about or felt insecure. ___
4. I thought about or felt threatened. ___
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Individual Difference Measures.
Scale: IUS (Uncertainty Intolerance Scale)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please select the answer that best corresponds to how much you agree
with each item.

1. Unforeseen events upset
me greatly.
2. It frustrates me not
having all the
information I need.
3. Uncertainty keeps me
from living a full life.
4. One should always look
ahead so as to avoid
surprises.
5. A small unforeseen event
can spoil everything,
even with the best of
planning.
6. When it’s time to act,
uncertainty paralyses
me.
7. When I am uncertain I
can’t function very well.
8. I always want to know
what the future has in
store for me.
9. I can’t stand being taken
by surprise.
10. The smallest doubt can
stop me from acting.
11. I should be able to
organize everything in
advance.
12. I must get away from all
uncertain situations.

Not at all
characteri
stic of me

A little
characteri
stic of me

Somewha
t
characteri
stic of me

Very
characteri
stic of me

Entirely
characteristic
of me

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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Scale: Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (IAS)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
disagree
slightly
Slightly
agree
strongly
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
1 An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably
doesn't know too much.
2. There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.
3. A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be
done are always clear.
4. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small,
simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.
5. What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.
6. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or
unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for.
7. I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones
where all or most of the people are complete strangers.
8. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.
9. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while.*
10. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the
joy of living.*
11. It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a
simple one.
12. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who
don't mind being different and original.
13. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how
complicated things really are.*
14. Many of our most important decisions are based upon
insufficient information.
15. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give a
chance for one to show initiative and originality.*
16. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of
looking at things. *
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Scale: System Justification Scale (2013)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
disagree
slightly
Slightly
agree
strongly
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
1. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in America.
2. In general, I find American society to be fair.
3. Most of America’s policies serve the greater good.
4. In general, America’s political system operates as it should.
Scale: SDO (Social Dominance Orientation)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements.
1 = Strongly Disagree
7 = Strongly Agree
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use
1 2 3 4 5 6
force against other groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than
1 2 3 4 5 6
others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on
1 2 3 4 5 6
other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer 1 2 3 4 5 6
problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top
1 2 3 4 5 6
and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
1 2 3 4 5 6
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
1 2 3 4 5 6
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
1 2 3 4 5 6
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
1 2 3 4 5 6
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
1 2 3 4 5 6
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for
different groups.
13. Increased social equality is beneficial to society.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more
equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
16. No group should dominate in society.

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Scale: Belief in a Just World Scale (BJW)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below you will find various statements. Most likely, you will
strongly agree with some statements and strongly disagree with others. Sometimes you
may feel more neutral.Read each statement carefully and decide to what extent you
personally agree or disagree with it. Make the selection which best corresponds to this
judgment.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
disagree
slightly
Slightly
agree
strongly
disagree
disagree
agree
agree
1. I think basically the world is a just place.
2. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve.
3. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.
4. I am convinced that in the long run people will be compensated
for injustices.
5. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g.
professional, family, politics) are the exception rather than the
rule.
6. I think people try to be fair when making important decisions.

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6

1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6

Scale: (M10) Political Ideology
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions by choosing the answer
which most closely represents you.
1. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show
you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on
this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (please circle your answer)
1- Extremely Conservative
2- Conservative
3- Slightly Conservative
4- Moderate, Middle of the Road
5- Slightly Liberal
6- Liberal
7- Extremely Liberal
8- Haven’t Thought
9- Don’t Know/Other/NA
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Scale: Partisanship (Party ID)
2. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?
1. strong democrat
2. weak democrat
3. independent-democrat
4. independent-moderate
5. independent republican
6. weak republican
7. strong republican
8. libertarian
9. other, N/A
Scale: Trust in Government
INSTRUCTIONS: Following is a survey of political attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, and
values. Some of the items ask you to recall events from the past and so it is understood
that the information depends on the “best of your recollection.” But whatever you can
provide is greatly appreciated.
1. If you took a complaint about your community to a local government elected official
(i.e., city council member, county supervisor, school board member, etc.), do you
believe that she or he would pay a lot of attention, some attention, very little attention,
or no attention at all to your complaint?
___ No attention
___ Very little attention
___ Some attention
___ A lot of attention
2. If you took a complaint about the national government to a representative of the
national government, do you believe that she or he would pay a lot of attention, some
attention, very little attention, or no attention at all to your complaint?
___ No attention
___ Very little attention
___ Some attention
___ A lot of attention
___ A lot of attention
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Scale: Political Self-Efficacy
3. How much influence do you believe someone like you can have over decisions made
by local government?
___ No influence
___ Very little influence
___ Some influence
___ A lot of influence
4. How much influence do you believe someone like you can have over decisions made
by the national government?
___ No influence
___ Very little influence
___ Some influence
___ A lot of influence
Scale: Political Interest
5. Thinking about your local community, how interested are you in local community
politics and local community affairs?
___ Not Interested
___ Slightly Interested
___ Somewhat Interested
___ Very Interested
6. How interested are you in national politics and national affairs?
___ Not Interested
___ Slightly Interested
___ Somewhat Interested
___ Very Interested

169
Scale: Political Attention
7. Thinking about your local community, how much attention do you pay to local
community politics and local community elections?
___ No attention
___ Not much attention
___ Some attention
___ A lot of attention
8. How much attention do you pay to national politics and national elections?
___ No attention
___ Not much attention
___ Some attention
___ A lot of attention
Scale: Political Knowledge
9. In general, how knowledgeable do you consider yourself to be about local
community politics?
___ Not knowledgeable
___ Not very knowledgeable
___ Somewhat knowledgeable
___ Very knowledgeable
10. In general, how knowledgeable do you consider yourself to be about national
politics?
___ Not knowledgeable
___ Not very knowledgeable
___ Somewhat knowledgeable
___ Very knowledgeable
Scale: Voting Behavior
11. Have you ever participated in a political action or activity?
Y/ N
12. Do you anticipate voting in the general (November) elections?
Y/ N
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Experiment 2 priming materials:
(Condition A) Uncertainty Condition:
INSTRUCTIONS: This is a word search puzzle. Please attempt to find (visually locate
with your eyes) the following words in the puzzle: UNCERTAIN, DICEY, GAMBLE,
SHAKY, WAVERING. Please time yourself using http://www.online-stopwatch.com or
by your timing method of choice. Spend 2 MINUTES searching for the words in caps
above, and then stop.
When you locate the words, simply remember WHICH of the words you located and
WHERE on the puzzle you saw them. When approximately 2 minutes have
completed, click to the next page.
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(Condition B) Mortality Salience Condition:

INSTRUCTIONS: This is a word search puzzle. Please attempt to find (visually locate

with your eyes) the following words in the puzzle: DEATH, MORTAL, GRAVE,
TOMBS, DEMISE. Please time yourself using http://www.online-stopwatch.com or by
your timing method of choice. Spend 2 MINUTES searching for the words in caps above,
and then stop.
When you locate the words, simply remember WHICH of the words you located and
WHERE on the puzzle you saw them. When approximately 2 minutes have
completed, click to the next page.
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(Condition C) Control Condition:
INSTRUCTIONS: This is a word search puzzle. Please attempt to find (visually locate
with your eyes) the following words in the puzzle: TELEVISION, DUST, GOGGLES,
AFTERNOON, SPOT. Please time yourself using http://www.online-stopwatch.com or
by your timing method of choice. Spend 2 MINUTES searching for the words in caps
above, and then stop.
When you locate the words, simply remember WHICH of the words you located and
WHERE on the puzzle you saw them. When approximately 2 minutes have
completed, click to the next page.
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